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This thesis presents a comparative analysis of the legal investment frameworks of the 
European Union and China in African countries. The thesis reviewed financial instru-
ments of foreign direct investments, official development assistance and other official 
flows. The legal analysis focus on the demand on political conditions to access the fi-
nancial assistance; under which conditions are the projects tendered; and which labor 
standards set the parties while the project is implemented. All reflected under the as-
pect of the fairest condition for African countries. 
The comparison figured out that the European Union with its demands for the imple-
mentation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law facing certain reluctance of 
most African governments for a full implementation while contrary to that the One-
China principle is broadly acknowledge by African governments to gain investments.  
When projects are tendered the research presents that the European Union searches 
for local and regional providers to strengthen African businesses. This with guidelines 
for core labor laws based on human rights when it comes to the implementation. While 
China tenders with a strong commercial self-interest and does not set any labor stand-
ards relaying on local laws and showing limited interest and understanding when it 
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1. Chapter: Introduction  
1.1. Background to the study 
Africa’s need for foreign investments, whether it is foreign direct investments by 
the private sector or by non-African governments or international organisations, is un-
abated. In the last two decades Africa has found new partner who seek to grow their 
own economies whilst also benefiting African countries. This “new scramble for Africa” 
as resulted in new competition and the option for African countries to be able to 
choose who they will partner with, but it is still an unclear field for African govern-
ments.1 
The western private sector invests in the African continent but with concerns of 
insecurities.2 Until the late nineteen nineties western governments and international 
organizations were major investors in Africa. The European Union (“EU”) with its 
member states, however, is still the largest provider for investments worldwide.3  
These investments are provided in the form of development aid. It is however 
noteworthy that African communities have been vocal critics of the contrary interests 
of trade and development aid.4 On the other side they also rely on such financial as-
sistance. In the last two decades China has become more active in Africa and West-
ern communities have started to review their Africa strategies and try to have stronger 
engagement with the continent. The EU with its recently newly elected commission 
and the Brexit challenge is reviewing its Africa agendas for the foreseeable future. A 
clear commitment for development and support to Africa was set by the new president 
of the EU commission when she made her first official visit to the headquarters of the 
African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2019.5 
Brexit will reduce the amount available to the EU to spend on investments and 
aid through its own budget, the European Investment Bank, and the separate budget 
 
1 Nicholas Norbook, Patrick Smith “The World Bank and IMF are necessary evils” (2018) 106 The Africa Report 
49-50. 
2 The G20 launched in 2017 the initiative “Compact with Africa” to promote and facilitate private investments in 
Africa. 
3 European Commission “International development Aid” available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-econ-
omy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/international-economic-relations/international-development-
aid_en Note this and all following links were accessed on 09 February 2020. 
4 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon‘s Gift (2009) 148-149. 





of the European Development Fund (“EDF”). The 11th EDF which expires at the end of 
February 2020 is planned to be extended to 2027.6 
Through Brexit Britain can redesign its own foreign policies and be less collu-
sive with the EU in search of new trade partners and alliances. Even when the status 
quo does not change for the first year after Brexit, Britain could please African coun-
tries and seek to renew their Commonwealth bonds by intensify its aid or investments 
offers.7 Britain’s priorities however are as yet not clear.8 It is noteworthy that the inter-
est in Africa is not limited to the developed nations. Emerging countries are also seek-
ing to expand their economies whilst strengthening their economic relations with Af-
rica. A good example of this is an association of key emerging national economies 
made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa known as the BRICS who 
are the newly industrialized nations looking forward to expand their economies.9  
Over the last two decades’ African countries have as such gained more options 
for obtaining investments from different partners. China is probably the most active 
and controversial new actor in Africa. In 2000 China and 44 African countries 
launched the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) where they discussed fu-
ture economic and development cooperation for their mutual benefit.10 Every three 
years since then China announced a new budget to be used for investing across the 
African continent.  
It cannot be expected that China, which doubled and tripled its investment 
budget in Africa in the last two decades, will raise the budget much higher.11 In fact, 
the $US 60 billion China promised in 2018 are not provided fully from Chinese public 
budget. $US 10 billion is said to be invested through China’s private sector, which is 
strongly promoted by the Chinese government.12 Changes in 2018 FOCAC financial 
 
6 European Parliament “Fact Sheets on the European Union Multiannual Financial Framework” May 2019, availa-
ble at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/29/mehrjahriger-finanzrahmen.  
7 Ian Mitchell, Kimberly Ann Elliot “Brexit: What Next for Trade and Development?” Centre for Global Develop-
ment (30.01.2020) available at: https://www.cgdev.org/blog/brexit-what-next-trade-and-development. 
8 Kanika Saigal “London Calling Africa” (2018) 103 The Africa Report, September 57. 
9 Théophile Dzaka-Kikouta, Francis Kern, Chiara Gonella “Chinese economic co-operation with Central Africa and 
the transfer of knowledge and know-how” (2013) 2 African East-Asian Affairs, 39. 
10 FOCAC Action Plan 2000, section 1.1. 
11 Yun Sun “China’s 2018 financial commitments to Africa: Adjustment and recalibration” (05.09.2018) Brookings 
available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/09/05/chinas-2018-financial-commitments-
to-africa-adjustment-and-recalibration/. 






pledges were interpreted as China’s concern of its returns and commercial viability.13 
In the meantime some countries have renegotiated credit lines with China as a result 
of having issues with repaying their loans.14 Western countries are concerned about 
China’s presence in Africa and regularly question its accountability for its investments 
and causing debt.15 Similarly individual politicians, businesses and the media are also 
critical of China’s involvement in Africa.16 In contrast the governments of African coun-
tries appreciate China’s engagement and interest in the continent. 
Most of the literature and news reports which look at African foreign invest-
ments only analyse or discuss the socio-economic or financial effects on Africa benefi-
ciary countries of that receive investments from West and China. Both these financial 
providers or investors are economically and financially stronger than African countries 
and can therefore dictate the legal terms and conditions for the provision of the rele-
vant investment. Such terms and conditions however sometimes conflict with domestic 
legal systems in African recipient countries. There is a significant dearth of analyses 
covering the legal terms, which covering the access, the tendering and the labour 
standards which occur to realize the investment projects in African countries.    
 
1.2. Principal Research Questions and Research Objectives  
This thesis will juxtapose and comparatively analyse the investment legal 
frameworks set by the EU (the “EU’s Investment Legal Framework”) and those set by 
China (the “China’s Investment Legal Framework”) for African countries. The thesis 
will have particular regard to the terms and conditions upon which the EU or China 
provides access, issues tenders and sets labour standards for investment projects in 
African countries. The question then arises which of the two frameworks is more com-
patible with the legal systems of African countries and sets the fairer conditions.17 This 
thesis as such endeavours to answer the following three sub-questions arise: 
 
13 Sun op cit note 11 
14 Morris Kiruga “Ethiopia’s China challenge” (27.03.2019) The Africa Report available at: https://www.theafri-
careport.com/11080/ethiopias-china-challenge/. 
15 Brautigam op cit note 4 at 12-13. 
16 Chris Alden, Christopher R. Hughes “Harmony and Discord in China’s Africa Strategy: Some Implications for 
Foreign Policy” The China Quarterly 2009 570; Stephen Chan “New departures” 99 (2018) The Africa Report 23. 
17 When in this work “African countries” or synonyms are used relating to “African countries” those countries are 





 (1) How compatible are the political demands of the Investment Legal Frameworks 
with African countries to get access to financial assistance? 
(2) How are projects in Africa tendered for under the China’s Investment Legal Frame-
works and under the EU’s Investment Legal Framework?  
(3) How are employees who are assisting with implementing the projects protected un-
der both Investment Legal Frameworks? 
The research is made in order to determine whether African countries have 
made drastically changes in their legal system putting back their own regulations or 
even raising standards. The comparative analysis could come to the result that the 
conditions are better, equal or worse than the other regarding African domestic legal 
systems. It must to be noticed that by covering the whole continent, different legal sys-
tem could be more or less compatible with those conditions. However, it can be as-
sumed that the EU and China investment legal frameworks apply continental-wide. 
 
1.3. Relevance of Study 
The main aim of comparative law studies is to provide knowledge.18 This 
knowledge can, for example, assist with making domestic adjustments to local legisla-
tion in reaction to certain developments relating to investment conditions. But it also 
could motivate African countries to consider negotiating new or re-negotiating existing 
investment agreements and make adjustments to advance their legal systems. This 
knowledge could also empower African countries to demand more responsibility from 
foreign investors pointing out that other investors offer fairer conditions. China works 
on a bilateral basis the EU has bilateral and multilateral frameworks, however, both re-
view or agree to new agreements periodically.  
 
1.4. Research methodology  
The information and data used for this study was obtained from desk research. 
The author undertook a review of relevant legal material such as legislation regula-
tions, policy documents, white papers and court decisions, legal customs as well as 
relevant literature. The literature included hard copy or digital books, journals, articles 
 





and reports as well as information gleaned from reliable websites. All the relevant data 
and information was systematically reviewed, analysed and processed for inclusion in 
this thesis by the author with the goal of achieving the research objectives noted 
above. The methodology of the comparison will be specified below in section 4.2. 
Comparative law follows a certain structure. In the following two chapters the 
Investment Legal Frameworks are introduced and examined on the terms and condi-
tions regarding the research questions of section 1.2. In the fourth chapter a critical 
evaluation of the found terms and conditions is given which concludes in the compara-
tive analysis, using legal arguments measuring which of these applying conditions are 
the preferable.  
 
1.5. Research Limitations 
International investment law is a vast legal field. Each country has its own com-
plex laws and policies which influence international investment agreements and in-
vestments. Those agreements may be bilateral or multilateral. This thesis as such will 
face several limitations in examining these investment agreements and the conditions 
that apply to the parties involved. The primary handicap is that examples of Chinese 
international investment agreements are not publicly available. It will therefore not be 
possible to effectively compare the precise legal frameworks with precision and accu-
racy. Under these circumstances, this work will rely on the accessible documents 
which are secondary sources such as scholar articles. The limitation of access to rele-
vant documents is further exacerbated by the fact that some of the accessible docu-
ments are in Chinese which is a language that the author cannot read.  
This thesis will not touch on European Migration Return Agreements, which are often 
combined with aid and investments too but not in force yet with African countries.19 
Furthermore, no view is taken in relation to Double-taxation-treaties, which rely more 
on the treatment of private investments.20 Environmental standards are also not dis-
 
19 Anne Meike Riebau, “Rückübernahmeabkommen und partnerschaftliche Steuerungsinstrumente: Menschen-
rechte als wirtschaftliche Tauschware auf dem politischen Tableau?“, (2015) ZAR 63. - Since more and more refu-
gees from Africa arrive in the EU each year, the EU tries with these agreements to send them back. Another op-
tion is that the north African countries hold those refugees back. Therefore, the EU offers financial benefits for 
those countries. But, till today none of them agreed to those agreements.  
20 Double-taxation-treaties are used to avoid that the investor has to pay taxes in his home country and the 





cussed due to concerns about the length of this paper. For instance, the bulk of differ-
ent financial instruments used by, for example, the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund 
or the China-Africa Development Fund, cannot be considered, assuming that the 
same legal conditions this thesis deals with would apply. 
 
1.6. Structure of Dissertation 
The first chapter introduces the subject matter of the thesis, the research aims 
and methodology. Followed by a discussion of the historical, socio-economic and fi-
nancial aspects of investments in African countries by the EU and China. 
The second chapter will critically discuss the EU’s Africa Investment Legal 
Framework. The main constitutional treaties and development programs of the EU will 
be examined and the different development programs and the conditions imposed 
thereunder on African countries to access the relevant funding will be discussed. The 
second chapter will also examine the European Development Fund which is regulated 
in the Cotonou Agreement as a major source of finance from the EU to African coun-
tries. The chapter concludes by dealing with the procurement conditions and the la-
bour standards set under the EU Investment Legal Framework for investments in Af-
rica. 
The third chapter will critically discuss China’s Africa Investment Legal Frame-
work. This chapter will initially discuss the broad policies for foreign aid and the econ-
omy applicable to Chinese commercial investments in Africa. More Africa specific poli-
cies and FOCAC which facilitates Chinese aid and investments will then be consid-
ered. The last part of the chapter will use case studies to critically examine conditions 
for procurement and labour standards under the Chinese Investment Legal Frame-
work for investments in Africa. 
Chapter four will compare China’s Africa Investment Legal Framework with the 
EU’s Africa Investment Legal Framework. This comparison will be split into three sub-
questions which discus which investor sets fairer conditions for African countries. 
Each section will explain how the rule(s) of each legal framework apply before the 





Chapter five will conclude this thesis with a review and some final remarks re-
garding what African countries should consider by obtaining investments from foreign 
investors.  
 
1.7. Introduction in international investments in Africa from historical, so-
cio-economic and financial perspectives 
To provide a better understanding of European and Chinese investments in Af-
rica and their different approaches some historical background is set out below. That 
will be followed by a discussion of the socio-economic interests of the EU and China in 
investing in Africa in conjunction with the Africa’s needs for investments. In the third 
section terms and definition of “investor” and the “financial investment” types will be 
given, considering the previous sections. 
 
1.7.1. Historical background of investing in Africa 
The different approaches and objectives of the Investor Legal Frameworks are 
possibly shaped by historical events and relations between China and the EU and Af-
rica. It is as such crucial that these past events are summarily described below. 
a. Europe and the European Union: Since ancient times trade took place in the 
Mediterranean Sea between Europe and northern Africa. With the beginning of coloni-
alism, the European powers moved to Africa to enslave the continent and exploit it for 
agriculture and mining products. The Europeans built new settlements and developed 
existing infrastructure. That being said any investment by colonial powers into their Af-
rican colonies at the time cannot be understood as foreign investment.21  
When the first African states received independence in the 1950s and 60s their 
old bonds with former colonial powers remained active. The former colonial powers 
became responsible for their former colonies and began to provide financial assis-
tance.22 Companies from the former mother countries which were, active in Africa, in-
vested for the now cross border. In 1958 the European Community (“EC”), which was 
the precursor to EU, was constituted and the first common policies for development 
aid for Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (“ACP”) states were set and seen as a role 
 
21 Markus Krajewski “Wirtschaftsvölkerrecht” 4 ed (2017) para. 529. 





model for north-south relations.23 The establishment of the EC led to the formation of 
the EDF which gave grants and concessional loans to former European colonies. In 
the raising Cold War the fund gave financial assistance to all countries regardless of 
their political system. 
The EDF was later linked to former economic partnership agreements begin-
ning with the Yaoundé (Cameroon) agreement, 1975 and later with the treaties from 
Lomé I-IV (Togo). The European Community promised aid and offered preferential tar-
iffs to the European market. The provided aid that was provided did not develop the 
African recipient countries as expected.24 For this reason, the EC with the ACP-coun-
tries launched a new agreement in Cotonou (Benin) in 2000. These agreements were 
based on European aid for the ACP-parties and set out preferential trade conditions 
and provided room for further political dialogue. 
Today the EU seeks Economic Partnership Agreements (“EPAs”) with Regional 
Economic Communities (“RECs”) as the preferential trade treatments for all ACP-
states do not comply with the laws of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). These 
EPAs are free trade agreements which are based on reciprocity which means the EU 
will be able to export goods to ACP-states and be exempted of custom tariffs. Critics 
have expressed the view that trade liberalisation will weaken economic development 
and will be counterproductive to development aid.25 While the EU and some RECs 
signed EPAs already some countries are still hesitating to join those agreements.   
b. China: The first and friendly contact between China and the African continent 
dates back to the 9th century, as proven by archaeological findings of porcelain from 
that period in today’s South Africa and Zimbabwe.26 Later China was occupied like the 
African continent by several European powers during the colonial period.  
When the first African states became sovereign in the 1950s and 60s, China of-
fered formal diplomatic relations to the newly independent African countries and even 
technical assistance and aid.27 The aid was given initially only to socialist countries but 
 
23 Sven Grimm, “Afrika in der internationalen Politik – Die Verträge von Lomé und Cotonou“ (2009) 2 Informatio-
nen zur politischen Bildung 63. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid at 64. 
26 Alex Perry “In Afrika: Reise in die Zukunft” (2016) 475. 






China later changed this policy and aid was offered to countries with other political ide-
ology as well.28  
During that time China set, for purposes of its international relations, the Five Princi-
ples of Peaceful Coexistence, which are respect for sovereignty and territory integrity, 
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual and 
peaceful coexistence.29 These are repeatedly used in today’s foreign related policies 
of China. In 1955, during the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, China 
and 28 other newly independent states agreed to ten principles which contain those 
five principles and acknowledged the United Nations (“UN”) for instance.30 Through 
these new alliances China received a seat in the Security Council of the UN.31 
China expanded developing aid to thirty African countries in the 1970s.32 After 
Mao Zedong’s death, China’s engagement in Africa increased rapidly from aid to 
multi-form and mutually-beneficial cooperation in the 1980s.33 In the late 1970s China 
opened its economy slightly and began to grow. The relationship with Africa was 
broadened in several areas, like finance, investment, trade, development assistance, 
technology transfer and training, tourism and cultural exchange.34 In 1999 China an-
nounced its “Going Global Policy” that pushes Chinese firms to invest abroad. 
Through guarantees of the Chinese government Chinese private investors took higher 
risks in Africa than other investors.35    
In 2000 China and 44 African countries founded FOCAC with the objective of 
coordinating equal economic and social development on both sides. During the latest 





29 Chinadaily “Backgrounder: Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (22.04.2015) available at: https://www.chi-
nadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/2015-04/22/content_20509374.htm. 
30 Chinadaily “China and Zhou Enlai lay basis for the future at Bandung Conference” (22.04.2015), available at: 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/2015-04/22/content_20509367.htm. 
31 White paper op cit note 26. 
32 David Haroz “China in Africa: Symbiosis or Exploitation?” 35 (2011) The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 67. 
33 Ibid, White paper op cit 26. 
34 Haroz op cit note 31 at 65. 





1.7.2. Socio-economic aspects for investments in Africa 
As pointed out in the previous section the 54 African countries are recognized 
as developing countries, lack well developed economies and seek to raise their stand-
ard of living. China, who shares a similar history as a former colony, is already an 
emerging country but also aims to develop to a fully industrialized nation. The EU as 
an international organization represents the interests of its member states, some of 
which were former colonial powers. It will be explained the importance of investments 
for African countries and reflecting the differences of the two counterparts. Afterwards 
the interests to invest in Africa by the EU and China will be examined.  
a. Africa’s need for Investments: African countries differ in size, demographic 
trends, levels of economic development and natural resources. African countries are 
in debt and as such investment may help to reduce this debt. Some African countries 
hope for a debt cancellation.36 In general, African countries have an interest in invest-
ments to develop their underdeveloped infrastructure. Those infrastructure invest-
ments include bridges, schools, hospitals, railroads, roads, dams, telecommunication 
networks, and other critical infrastructure across Africa.37 Aid and foreign direct invest-
ments (“FDIs”) can transfer technical knowledge and assistance which help to develop 
economies.   
Since their independence African states have sought to cut their last links to co-
lonialism, while on the other hand they are dependent on foreign investment and de-
velopment aid to build up their economies.38 Besides aid; it is essential to attract FDIs 
for further economic development.39 French and British companies are the most ac-
tives investors in their former colonies.40 Both pay the most development aid in these 
countries and support and advocate for African interests in the EU.41 While the num-
ber of members in the EU increased in the last decades, the budget of the European 
Development Funds grew with it. And the EU as in international organization is seen 
 
36 Haroz op cit note 31 at 74. 
37 Haroz op cit note 31 at 65, 73. 
38 Paul G. Adogamhe, “PAN-AFRICANISM Revisited: Vision and Reality of African Unity and Development” 2 
(2008) African Review of Integration 11-12. 
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as a role model for the aim of the African Union and the RECs for an integrated Af-
rica.42 
Contrary to the EU China is seen as a modern alternative to the old colonial 
legacy of Europe.43 Chinese presence in Africa is often understood as a more equal 
partnership as opposed to the relationship to the Europeans.44 China faced similar is-
sues as African countries in the past and has become a role model for developing 
countries that are looking for a strategy that pushes their economy from a developing 
level to a more industrialized and competitive one. China reduced its high poverty rate 
within twenty years.45 China is seen by African countries as a resources of profession-
alized training and new technology, like machinery, electronic equipment and high-
tech products.46 In addition to that the cooperation with Chinese banks often provide 
African countries with more favourable terms than the Western commercial lenders 
since the loans are subsidized by the Chinese government.47  
b. The EU motivation to invest in Africa: With the end of colonialism, the Euro-
pean powers tried to take responsibility for the continent.48 Article 21 of the Treaty of 
the European Union (“TEU”) sets out the principles of European foreign policy.49 This 
article calls for the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and validity of human 
rights, which together should provide sustainable development.50 Article 21(2d) TEU 
provides that international relations should be focused on the cooperation for sustaina-
ble economic development and the improvement of society and the environment in de-
veloping countries, with the main goal of fighting poverty. More specifically “The New 
European Consensus on Development”, which is a shared vision and framework for 
action for development cooperation for the EU and its member states, covers specific 
topics aimed at reducing poverty through education for the youth, strengthening 
women rights and supporting the UN 2030 Agenda.51 
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45 Ibid at 68. 
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Furthermore, article 21(2e) TEU provides for the promotion of integration of all 
countries in world trade and the removal of trade barriers. Article 21(2f) TEU does pro-
vide rules for the protection of the environment and sustainable management of natu-
ral resources for sustainable development. The EU as such supports RECs and the 
African Union (“AU”). 
Security and migration are other EU interests.52 The EU seeks ways to stop mi-
gration flows to the EU and end the related violent spill-over effects through educa-
tional exchanges and security assistance. Due to migration concerns the EU has a 
vested interest in the maintenance of peace and stabilisation in Africa.53   
Finally, as an economic community the EU tries to strengthen trade relations 
with African states and has concluded EPAs with five African regions. The EU also 
promotes trade through the initiative of the WTO “Aid for Trade” which should help de-
veloping countries to mobilize resources for trade.54  
c. Chinese motivation to invest in Africa: China uses aid and investments to 
support three core priorities. These are strategic diplomacy, ideological values and 
commercial benefits.55 
By building new alliances in Africa China is looking to strengthen its role at an 
international level. African states have historically supported China and rallied to 
strengthen its role at an international level. The success of this support and related po-
litical ties was evident when African states supported China to receive a seat on the 
UN Security Council. With the One-China Policy, China tries to isolate Taiwan and has 
requested African states to support and give up their diplomatic relations with Taiwan 
as a sovereign nation.56 With their economic growth and international presence, espe-
cially in Africa, China tries to present itself as a benevolent global power instead of the 
EU and the United States of America.57 
As Chinas domestic labour costs are rising there is an increasing need to relo-
cate at least low-skilled and highly polluting industries to other countries in the same 
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manner that Taiwan and Japan did with China a few decades ago.58 The restructuring 
of China’s economy developed it to an industrialized country but has led to a greater 
need for resources. This need for natural resources, like oil and minerals, to feed its 
growing economy can be satisfied by Africa.59  
Furthermore, China’s private sector also seeks new cash flow opportunities in 
form of investments in Africa.60 The Chinese government has imposed its new econ-
omy plan on the private sector. Chinese companies are looking to gain profit in foreign 
markets, which the Chinese economy can no longer provide in sufficient quantities.61 
Africa offers a great market of over one billion potential consumers of Chinese goods. 
China seeks to use this potential in accessing African states.62 
 
1.7.3. Types of Investments  
The different historic backgrounds and the socio-economic interests of the EU 
and China have shaped the way they invest in Africa and other parts of the world. 
China has many state-owned-enterprises which invest through FDIs which are elabo-
rated on first below. Following this the official development assistance of the European 
Union will be explained in order to explain Chinas governmental investments which is 
a combination of the previous two models. 
a. Foreign Direct Investments: This model is used in the private economy to in-
vest abroad. Private investors are as defined in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) can 
be natural persons but the majority are companies (juristic persons). These investors 
have a different nationality then the host-country. A foreign direct investment means 
that an investor is economically active in another country permanent or for a period of 
time.63 In the BIT between South Africa and China article 1 (1) defines an investment 
differing as 
 “(a) movable and immovable property as well as any property rights, such as 
mortgages, liens and pledges; (b) shares, debentures, stock and any other kind of par-
ticipation in companies; (c) claims to money or to any other performance having an 
economic value; (d) intellectual property rights, in particular copyrights, patents, utility-
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model patents, registered designs, trade-marks, trade-names, trade and business se-
crets, technical processes, know-how and good-will; (e) concessions conferred by law, 
including concessions to search for, or exploit resources.”.64  
In all scenarios, the investor aims to generate a return higher than the invest-
ment. Depending on the investment the return, as defined in article 1(3) of this BIT in-
cludes “profits, dividends, capital gains, interest, royalties or other legitimate in-
come”.65 For example, the investor can build a new factory (so-called greenfield in-
vestment)66, to benefit from low labour costs. Or the investor acquires an existing pro-
duction location or joins one (so-called joint venture)67.  
FDIs have an important effect on the economic development of the host-coun-
try.68 Compared to countries from Asia and Latin America African countries receiving 
significantly less foreign direct investments.69 In Asia the most foreign direct invest-
ments are made by China.70  
b. Official Development Assistance: FDIs can be contrasted with Official Devel-
opment Assistance (ODA) given by governments or international organizations like the 
EU.71 The term ODA was defined by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in 1969.72  
“ODA flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and 
to multilateral development institutions that are: (i.) Provided by official agencies, in-
cluding state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and (ii.) Conces-
sional (i.e. grants and soft loans) and administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective.”73 
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The EU is empowered by its member states to give ODA to developing coun-
tries.74 The OECD provides a list of over 150 countries classified as developing coun-
tries which are eligible to receive ODA.75 The concessional element in this definition 
can be technical assistance, grants without repayment provisions or soft loans with a 
lower interest rate than from the financial market.76 These loans always offer lengthy 
repayment times. Debt relief and loans to the private sector are also regarded as 
ODA.77 The use of ODA for military or commercial purposes is excluded as ODA be-
cause it must serve the welfare needs of the recipient.78  
c. Investments with Chinese characteristics: ODA is a model developed by in-
dustrialized economies from the global north. In south-south relations these terms are 
not used and government grants to other countries are not specifically named.79 
Those south-south investments are described as “expressions of solidarity and coop-
eration borne out of shared experiences and sympathies”.80 Therefore, not all types of 
Chinese investments met the definition of ODA. Chinas different understanding is also 
evidenced by the fact that for a long time it has had no independent aid agency.81 The 
China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) was finally established 
in April 2018 and it administers grants and interest-free loans, while the other financial 
instruments are managed by the Ministry of Commerce.82 
China offers interest-free loans, debt-relief, grants and technical assistance 
which falls into the segment of ODA.83 The concessional loans, which China under-
stands as aid just have just an interest rate of 2-3 per cent.84 Most of those loans and 
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grants are provided for social non-profit projects, in sectors like health or education.85 
In the latest FOCAC summit China promised $US 15 billion on aid.86  
For more profitable investments such as infrastructure or industrial projects, 
China offers commercial loans, which have regular financial market-oriented interest 
rates and can be secured by raw-materials like oil from the recipient country.87  Never-
theless, China also combines grants with loans which makes it often difficult to distin-
guish between aid or commercial investment.88 Chinas commercial interest were high-
lighted at the 2018 FOCAC summit when China promised $US 20 billion in commer-
cial loans and a provisional $US 10 billion for Chinese private and state-owned com-
panies.89 
The Chinese government also owns companies which invest in Africa. These 
state-owned enterprises invest in through FDIs or joint ventures in the African host-
country.90 In a decision of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes the panel decided that governmental-controlled entities can invest in the form of 
FDIs as long as they act in a commercial rather than in a governmental capacity.91  
This means that those investors are also protected under the BITs. 
Going Forward the term development aid will be used when referring to invest-
ments from the EU and the term investment will be used when referring to investments 
from China as investments from China results in the actual flow of money to African 
states in the in form of either official flows or ODA. There is very little development aid 
flowing from China to Africa. 
 
1.8. Conclusion 
The historical background of the EU has informed its socio-economic develop-
ment and poverty reduction initiatives in Africa. The EU also takes into account com-
mercial and security interests although these are not expressly reflected in relevant 
policy instruments.  
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China shares the same historical background as Africa but unlike Africa it al-
ready went through strong development. Its aim to industrialize its economy is re-
flected in its engagement with Africa. It uses commercial investments and ODA to ac-
cess African countries for raw materials and to generate profit and its commercial in-
terest in such arrangements is dominant. 
 
2. Chapter: The EU’s Investment Legal Framework for Development Aid 
2.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed the European approach to develop African 
countries through financial instruments of ODA. The EU’s aim is sustainable socio-
economic development and the reduction of poverty in Africa.  This chapter considers 
whether the legal terms and conditions of the EU’s Investment Legal Framework are 
fair to African countries and analyses which conditions apply to African countries.  This 
chapter further considers how African countries get access to the different aid pro-
grams, how those projects are procured and under which labour standards these pro-
jects may be realized. The chapter will delve into the structure of the EU’s Investment 
Legal Framework and the EDF which is the main European instrument for aid to Af-
rica. The chapter will conclude by discussing procurement and labour rules regarding 
development projects. 
 
2.2. The Legal Framework and its conditions 
The EU as an international organization is empowered through the Treaty of the 
European Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty of the Function of the European Union 
(“TFEU”), which have equal standing, to act on behalf of its member states.92 The EU 
based on common values and interests of its member states.93 As an economic com-
munity the EU is empowered to regulate internal and external trade and tariffs of its 
member states.94  EU and its member states also share resources relating to security 
and ODA.95 The EU aims to have a coordinated and coherent external policy for its 
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member states.96 As will be shown by the analyses set out below, the EU fails to 
achieve its goals in certain respect. 
 
2.2.1. Article 209 TFEU 
Several EU regulations and policies allude to basic conditions for the provision 
of development aid but these are specifically mentioned in the TFEU itself.97 Part five 
of the TFEU sets out articles which empower the organs of the EU to provide aid to 
non-EU-countries. The legal basis for the provision of development aid by member 
states of the EU is codified in article 209 TFEU. 
Article 209(1) TFEU empowers the European Parliament and the Council to 
adopt measures for the implementation of development cooperation. While the EU is 
empowered to give aid member states are still able to fund their own development aid 
projects outside of the EU.98 The EU however tries to coordinate the individual aid pro-
grams of its member states with its own programs. Further to this in terms of article 
211 TFEU the EU is linked with other international organisations like the UN and they 
have implemented their agendas and objectives in their respective development poli-
cies too. The EU offers different forms of development programs for developing coun-
tries till emerging nations. This aid can be in form of financial support and technical co-
operation in relation to multiannual cooperation programmes or programs with a the-
matic approach or assistance in emergency situations (humanitarian aid).99 In some 
sectors the EU supports non-governmental organizations or offers decentralized coop-
eration focusing for example on the protection of the environment or gender main-
streaming.100 Those development programs are executed by the commission.101 Over-
all the EU has three themed and four geographic programmes. Themed programs are 
accessible to countries world-wide while geographic programs are created for EU 
specified regions or countries. 
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a. Thematic programs: The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 
(“INSC”)102 is used to set a high standard of nuclear security and protection relating to 
nuclear material in non-EU-countries.103 The Instrument for Stability and Peace 
(“IfSP”)104 is used to strengthen the fight against terrorism, organized crime and pro-
tection of critical infrastructure and to react to crises.105 The European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (“EIDHR”)106 focuses on countries with records of hu-
man rights violations and its civil societies as well as promoting multilateral human 
rights instruments and assisting with democratic election observations.107  
b. Geographical programs: Geographical instruments are linked to selected 
countries. The European Neighborhood Instrument (“ENI”)108 is used to strengthen po-
litical and economic cooperation with non-EU-member states neighbouring or border-
ing to the EU.109 The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (“IPA”)110 supports 
countries which would like to join the EU and would be able to fulfil the requirements 
for membership.111 This programme aims to strengthens democracy, the rule of law, 
civil rights and socio-economic development. The Partnership Instrument (“PI”)112 fi-
nance projects with globally emerging nations who are interested in becoming strate-
gic partners of the EU.  
The Development Cooperation Instrument (“DCI”)113 aims to promote regional 
and country related cooperation.114 The DCI focuses on poverty reduction, climate 
protection, human development, food safety, sustainable agriculture and migration.115 
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A good example of a programme financed under the DCI is the Pan-African Pro-
gramme that was established in 2014 cover the whole African continent. The pro-
gramme focuses on peace, democracy, human rights, human development, sustaina-
ble development and continental integration. It recognizes the Agenda 2063 of the Af-
rican Union and promotes market integration and the enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty and skills development. 
To receive development aid under article 209(1) TFEU the countries must be 
developing countries. Which country qualifies and does not qualify as a developing 
country is not defined by EU primary law.116 Consequently, the EU has administrative 
discretion to qualify a country as developing or developed.117 In the regulation of the 
DCI article 1(1)(a) and in further regulations and EU documents a reference is made 
to the OECD list of developing countries.118 
 
2.2.2. Conditions based on the EU treaties and regulations 
Article 209(2) TFEU refers to article 208 TFEU and article 21 TEU. Article 208 
TFEU states that the development aid provided by the EU is provided in order to fulfil 
the external principles of the EU. Those external principles are listed in article 21 TEU. 
In addition to this, article 205 TFEU, being the “general provisions on the union’s ex-
ternal action” already links these actions to those external principles. This is used to 
ensure the consistency of the EU policies including development policies relating to 
non-EU-countries.119  
External principles and objectives are listed in article 21 TEU, while the European 
Council identifies “the strategic interests and objectives of the Union” in article 22 
TEU. The principles are similar to the internal values and principles listed in article 2 
TEU, which are fundamental for the EU.120 Article 3 TEU lists the objectives of the un-
ion which correspond with those set out in article 21(2) TEU.121  While article 3(5) TEU 
refers to EU’s interest to the protection and promotion of the EU values in the context 
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of the wider world. The corresponding values and principles shall be propagated by ar-
ticle 21 TEU.122 
In order to broaden and build partnerships the EU seeks non-EU-countries 
which share the same principles mentioned in article 21(1) TEU.123 Compliance with 
these principles and is a prerequisite by the EU for non-EU-countries to conclude part-
nerships with the EU.124 These values and principles in terms of article 2 TEU are de-
mocracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human 
dignity and the rights for minorities. The EU views these principles and values as be-
ing vital for development.125 These principles and values are mentioned in all regula-
tions relating to EU aid programmes, save for the Nuclear Safety program.126 For 
some programmes, such as the pre-accession program the EU imposes further condi-
tions like the requirement to comply with the principals of the market economy.127 
However, these are not programmes targeted at African countries.   
The three core values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law are fur-
ther elaborated on below. 
a. Human rights: One of the essential requirements for African countries for co-
operation with the EU is the respect for and protection of human and civil rights includ-
ing those for minorities.128 The organs of the EU themselves are bound to protect and 
preserve human rights, article 6 TEU. This article is binding on organs of the EU and 
aligns with the requirement set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms and the rights emanating from the constitutional traditions of the EU 
member states. The aforementioned charter, convention and constitutional traditions 
are not binding on African countries. That being said the EU does require compliance 
with at least the core human rights which are recognized even beyond the treaty and 
charter noted above.129 This contains for instance the right of live, prohibition of torture 
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and slavery, but also the right of privacy, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, 
right of property or the prohibition of discrimination.130 But, as stated in article 21(1) 
TEU, which recognize the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms, it also contains economic, social and cultural human rights.131 Those are 
also mentioned in the provisions of the regulations of the development pro-
grammes.132 
The EU as such expects the prosecution of human rights violations and a public 
ban on the death penalty and other inhuman practices.133 In line with this thinking the 
EU welcomes that “Angola became party to the Optional Protocol aiming to abolish 
the death penalty and a party to the Convention against Torture and other cruel inhu-
man or degrading treatment” in October 2019.134 In general the EU excludes all non-
EU-countries from a cooperation, not respecting human rights.135 The EU also stops 
providing any financial aid or support to and ceases cooperation with countries that vi-
olate human rights.  
b. Democratic principles: The EU also prioritises political stability. A lack of de-
mocracy is recognized as a source for conflicts.136 The understanding of democracy in 
the EU is based on freedom and equality of the citizens and through recurring elec-
tions to determine public power.137 The authority of public power, therefore, is based 
on the will of the citizens through periodic, unaltered, common and equal, secret elec-
tions.138 This includes the freedom to establish political parties and the access to pub-
lic administrative bodies.139 The EU expects that any countries have democratic pro-
cedures in place or that such procedures will be established soon.140 Accordingly the 
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c. Rule of Law: For stability purposes the EU seeks to strengthen the rule of law 
in aid recipient countries. Under the rule of law, the public authorities shall be bound to 
the laws. Part of the rule of law is the guarantee of legal protection.142 If there is a rule 
of law foreign investors require a fair trial any certainty that their assets are secured. 
To measure the implementation of the rule of law the EU Commission examines the 
separation of powers between the various arms of the state, the independence of the 
judiciary and the fight against corruption.143 As an example recently Mozambique as a 
recipient of aid from the EU faced the freezing of financial assistance, caused by cor-
ruption concerns raised by the EU and other donors.144 
A different example is the restoration of the judiciary in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo after three decades of conflict.145 The EU supported the restoration of 
the rule of law in that country through prosecution support units which aim to support 
the civil and military authorities to bring criminals to justice.146 The project was funded 
through the IfSP and supported through United Nations organizations and non-govern-
mental organizations.147 
 
2.2.3. The European Investment Bank and their Statute  
Besides the EU Commission executing grants and technical assistance through 
the programmes, the European Investment Bank gives commercial and concessional 
loans. Article 209(3) TFEU refers to the European Investment Bank (“EIB”) and its 
Statute to contribute the measures referred to article 209(1) TFEU. The EIB is part of 
the EU but is a separate legal body in terms of article 308 TFEU. Members of the EIB 
are all member states of the EU.148 The members provide the bank with its own capi-
tal, article 4 EIB-Statute. The EIB has functional autonomy and acts free from political 
influence as a private bank with equal conditions in the capital markets. However, it 
has also to act in the interest of the EU and is bound to the EU treaties especially the 
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principles of article 2 and 3 TEU, article 1 EIB-Statute.149 It is as such bound on hu-
man rights, social rights and environmental principles too.150 
Article 309 TFEU lists the tasks of the EIB. As a regional bank it is mainly fo-
cused on the EU internal market. But further tasks are mentioned in the TFEU.151 In 
1963 the EIB went global and the EU budget now gives guarantees for loans provided 
by the EIB to countries with political and sovereign risks.152 Nevertheless, investments 
made in non-EU-countries are restricted to the exception permit by the EU Parliament 
and the Council, article 16(2) EIB-Statute.153 The EIB is also involved with develop-
ment cooperation’s in African countries.154 Those cooperation’s are based on Article 
209(3) TFEU.155 Article 309 TFEU obliges the EIB to contribute to the implementation 
of the measures referred to article 209(1) TFEU through article 209(3) TFEU. 
Furthermore, the investments must conform to the external objectives of the 
EU.156 The obligations of the EIB are mentioned in several international agreements, 
like the Cotonou Agreement (see 2.2.4) and as such the EIB is obliged to fulfil those 
duties on behalf of the EU. For instance, the latest finance protocol for the Cotonou 
Agreement empowers the EIB to support local private sectors and the development of 
socio-economic infrastructure.157 
Article 309 TFEU restricts the EIB from operating in the non-profit-making 
space. The EIB as such may not make any profit and may only cover its costs.158 Con-
sequently the EIB lending rates depend on capital market conditions and requirements 
and it covers the typical risks when granting credit.159  Nevertheless, the EU shares 
some of the risk undertaken the EIB by backing EIB loans to developing countries with 
guarantees.160  
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While the EIB must be compliant with EU laws, it must ensure that its borrowers 
do not violate EU rules.161 It must as such set the conditions discussed above for bor-
rower in accordance with EU laws, especially article 21 TEU.162 
 
2.2.4. Conditions of the European Development Fund 
After examining the EIB and the TFEU in relation to its aid programs and condi-
tions the following section will focus on the Cotonou Agreement (“CA”). This is a multi-
lateral trade agreement which contains the most comprehensive development instru-
ment from the EU for African countries, the EDF. It was introduced as an individual in-
strument and thus far its budget is not part of the aid budget of the EU. It is the prime 
aid instrument from the EU to the ACP-countries.163 In order to supplement its budget 
the EDF also gets support from the DCI for purposes of forming the strategic relation-
ship with the African countries.164 The development of the EDF (a.) and then its cur-
rent conditions (b.) are described below. 
a. From Yaoundé to Cotonou: The institution of the EDF was already provided 
for in the treaties of Rome which established the former organization of the EU the Eu-
ropean Economic Community in 1957.165 The aim of the fund was to promote the eco-
nomic and social development of former colonies of Belgium, France, Italy and the 
Netherlands.166 The first fund was launched in 1959, to provide progressive develop-
ment in these areas.167 Since then, the fund has been renewed every five to seven 
years.168 
The second EDF was integrated into the first so-called Yaoundé Agreement 
from 1964.169 Most of the money paid out was non-repayable aid while the rest of it 
was paid out as loans which boar a special interest rate.170 The Yaoundé Agreement 
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made also provisions for a reciprocal preferential trade system for the ACP-countries 
to trade goods with European member states exempt from customs duties.171  
In 1973 Britain joined the European Community and confirmed its obligation to 
support the EDF and the EU development targets. This was further confirmed in 1975 
when the EDF was renewed and the former British colonies were brought into the 
Lomé Convention. The EDF now supports 46 countries. Besides providing develop-
ment aid the trade agreement was turned into a non-reciprocal preferential system 
which entitled ACP-countries not to pay customs duties anymore when importing 
goods into the EU countries.172 
As a result of human rights violations especially in Uganda the EC tried to intro-
duce a human rights clause in the second Lomé Convention. This clause sought to al-
low the donating EC to freeze aid and cease preferential treatments of ACP-countries 
which were violating human rights. Ultimately no such clause was introduced by the 
end of the negotiations. In the third Lomé Convention the preamble stated that the 
parties are bound to fundamental human rights.173 A concrete clause was then intro-
duced into the fourth Lomé Convention (Lomé IV) 1989. Article 5 Lomé IV states that 
development policies are closely linked to fundamental human rights.174 In the revised 
version from 1995, democratic principles and the rule of law were added to article 5 
Lomé IV.175 
The current agreement is the Cotonou Agreement from 2000 which expires in 
February 2020. To date three funds have been launched, and the current (11th) fund 
is the last within this agreement. The Cotonou Agreement is signed by 79 developing 
countries from Africa, Caribbean and Pacific, with 48 of these countries being from Af-
rica.   
b. The Cotonou Agreement: The agreement applies to those states who signed 
it. As the north-African countries have not signed it they are consequently no benefi-
ciaries of the EDF. However, beneficiaries of the agreement can also be the African 
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Union or other bodies authorized by ACP-states.176 Moreover, to strengthen the pri-
vate sector even companies can get financial support under this agreement.177 Even 
so, non-state actors from ACP-states, parliaments and other bodies of ACP-states and 
development banks can be provided with financial support.178  
Article 59 CA states that those bodies created by the ACP-states or the regional 
body which are going to implement the project or program will receive financial sup-
port. In article 2 CA it is stated that the ACP-states shall determine their own develop-
ment strategies and they shall be responsible for their own development strategies 
and the EU partners shall align their programs to those strategies.179 And further those 
strategies shall consider and involve non-state actors, ACP national parliaments and 
local authorities.180  
The coordination of these strategies and programs takes place through dia-
logues with each party on a regularly basis. The Council of Ministers carries out politi-
cal dialogue during an annual meeting at least.181 This dialogue can include discus-
sions about the coordination of programs at a regional or continental level, as this is 
recognized in the revised version of the agreement.182 In addition the private and so-
cial sector shall be developed through reforms, cooperation and other support.183 It 
also recognizes the cultural dimension which shall be integrated into development co-
operation.184 During the annual meetings the ministers are required to examine the 
process of development programs and to consider related problems.185 All projects 
can demand technical support and assistance to build national and regional capabili-
ties through the transfer of knowhow.186   
(i) European Development Fund: Articles 55 and 58 CA states that the finance 
cooperation shall support ACP-states, non-state-actors, regional organizations and 
also the AU to achieve their national and also regional development agendas. This is 
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used to ensure effective use of the financial support in each receiving country based 
on its individual needs.187 The aid is guided by the aid effectiveness agenda recog-
nized in the preamble as ‘results-oriented aid management’.188  
The financing can be provided directly to the programs or as credit lines. Hu-
man resources will be provided where required for the administration and evaluation of 
the relevant funding.189 How each project is financed is determined by mutual agree-
ments between ACP-beneficiaries and the EU.190 The execution of the budget shall be 
led by the EIB if it is a loan otherwise the EU commission administrates the relevant 
financial resources in the form of grants.191 Loans are provided by the EIB to enter-
prises under the conditions of Annex II of the Cotonou Agreement. The programs of 
the ACP-states are granted at the beginning of each multi-annual financial framework 
of the funds, after a country has submitted its program.192 
The EDF provides budget support. Article 39 of the EU Council Regulation 
2015/323 states that support will just be provided on the basis of mutual accountability 
and shared commitments of the parties to universal values.193 These values are again 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law with the aim of achieving sustainable and 
inclusive economic growth to reduce poverty. The EU Commission as such defines 
and monitors these conditions. If the ACP-state shows no satisfactory progress no 
budget will be disbursed to it.194 The review process is therefore used to measure the 
effectiveness of achieving the required values.195 
(ii) Value Conditions: In terms article 9 CA the parties are obliged to promote 
and protect all fundamental freedoms and human rights. The preamble gives more de-
tails about these human rights covers several international human rights conventions. 
From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to special Conventions on the Rights 
of the Child, Women, against Racial Discrimination and Refugees. It also recognizes 
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the human rights convention of the Council of Europe and the African Charter on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights.  
Article 9 CA also refers to democratic principles which ensure the legitimacy of 
a government authority and legality of the actions of such a government, which shall 
be founded on the rule of law. Under these principles it shall be ensured that good 
governance through transparency provides sustainable development.196 In addition 
this article recognizes corruption and bribery as a violation of the agreement, which 
the parties shall fight against together.197 
Those three principles shall apply in domestic and international policies within 
this agreement as the essential elements, even in relation to political dialogue. The 
development of the principles is regularly evaluated during the dialogues of the par-
ties.198 In instances where article 9(2) CA is violated both the relevant EU member 
state and ACP-country are allowed to seek for dialogues with the violating party.199 If 
no solution is found through consultations appropriate measures may be taken in ac-
cordance with international law.200 However, suspension from this agreement shall be 
the last resort.201 The same process applies for serious cases of corruption.202  
(iii) Preferential treatment and Economic Partnership Agreements: Economic 
and trade cooperation is the third pillar of the CA and is set out in title II of the agree-
ment.203 The aim of this cooperation is to gradually integrate the ACP-states into the 
world economy while still respecting the sovereignty of the ACP-states.204  
As stated in article 34(4) CA the cooperation shall be compliant with WTO laws. 
However, through article 35(3) CA the parties agree to special and differential treat-
ment for the ACP-countries. This translates into non-reciprocal treatment as the Ya-
oundé Conventions provided. This allows the ACP-countries to import goods to the EU 
exempt of customs duties. In fact, the WTO recognized the preferential treatment as a 
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violation of the most-favored-nation principle stated in article I:1 of the General Agree-
ment and Tariffs and Trade.205 As a reaction to the WTO violation statement the signa-
tory states of the Cotonou Agreement requested a waiver at the WTO for the transition 
to a compliant agreement.206 This waiver ended on the 31 December 2007. 
The EU and ACP-states agreed in article 36 CA to sign EPAs which are “WTO-
compatible”. There are five EU-African EPAs, adjusted to cover regional circum-
stances.207 All five African agreements are finally negotiated but just the EPA of the 
Southern African Development Community, Eastern and Southern Africa region and 
the EPA of Central Africa (just for Cameroon) are already in force.208 The other two 
EPAs are currently in the process of being signed.209 In order to be compliant with 
WTO laws the EPAs will have to be reciprocal regarding preferential trade. In terms of 
the EPAs that are partly in force the ACP-states have to harmonize their customs du-
ties to imports of the EU within a transition period.210 
It is worth noting that each of these agreements contain development aid 
clauses which refer to the articles of the CA.211 This means that the terms and condi-
tions remain as is so far. The budget for this aid refers consequently to the EDF. How-
ever, the 11th EDF will end on the 29th February 2020. But the EDF, prospectively in-
corporated in the EU multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027, will be contin-
ued.212 Consequently, the budget has to be shared through the different EPAs.  
 
2.3. Procurement and labour conditions 
After describing the different programs which African countries can access 
when they acknowledge and promote the values of the EU, this section will discuss 
the process for tendering those projects. The second part of this section will review the 
labour standards which apply during the realization of the projects.  
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2.3.1. Procurement conditions for aid projects 
The EU funds development projects in many African countries through its de-
velopment aid budgets and the EDF. In order to tender for these projects the recipi-
ents have to implement the procurement rules of the EU for their external actions.213 
The procurement rules are set out in article 26 Annex IV CA.214 These rules are 
fleshed out by the Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions 
(“PRAG”).215 The PRAG applies to the other programmes in addition to the EDF.216 If 
an aid project is supported by a loan by the EIB, the EIB may demand that the pro-
curement requirements set out in its Statue be followed in tendering for the project.217  
Although, many African countries have implemented their own procurement 
laws to ensure effectiveness, the EU Commission sets its own rules.218 The EU Com-
mission is empowered to set procurement rules for projects funded under the CA.219 
The EU would like to secure the effectiveness of its aid and has in the past experi-
enced issues when a lack of transparency could not prevent corruption or governance 
issues leading to the diminished effectiveness of its aid projects.220 It also seeks to 
achieve equal treatment and non-discrimination of eligible firms.221 Furthermore, the 
rules of the CA provides that the aim is to encourage the participation of local indus-
tries and as such preferential tendering must afforded to them.222 Moreover, in case 
no tenderer of an ACP-state applies, the contract shall be tendered to the company 
with the strongest involvement of human resources of ACP-citizens.223  
The PRAG provides seven procurement procedures for EU funded projects.224 
Which of the procedure applies depends on the type of project, its nature and value of 
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contract as determined by section 2.4.1. PRAG.225 For instance the restricted proce-
dure has selection criteria that must be satisfied.226 In the dynamic purchasing system 
the tender has to satisfy the requested criteria and must be submitted electronically.227 
Under the negotiated procedure the contracting authority has the choice to invite can-
didates to submit tenders.228 However not all procedures apply in ACP-countries.229 
The award is generally made to the best-value-for-money procedure230 for the most 
economically and quality advantageous tender.231  
The requirements that have to be complied with by tenderer to submit an appli-
cation are set out in section 2.3. PRAG. This section also deals with who may be ex-
cluded from the tendering process, for the particular tender as well as from all future 
procedures finance by the EU should they making false declarations, substantial er-
rors or commit irregularities or fraud in procurement procedure.232 This provision en-
sures just the exclusion for the tendering procedure for EU aid, not for domestic pro-
curements.233 A reason for this might be that the aid procurement happened mostly 
under EU execution.234 Therefore, the EU provides in each country an official to con-
trol and assist the local authorities for tendering aid projects. 
 
2.3.2. Labour Conditions completing aid projects 
When a project is tendered to a contractor certain labor standard apply to that 
contractor. The section below will examine the labor conditions set by the EU when 
completing projects linked to the provisions of development aid in African countries. 
The organs of the EU and EIB are bound to protect human rights.235 The demand for 
human rights already encompasses the protection of certain labor rights.236 
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When the EIB provides loan, which are not subject to the CA or another pro-
gram the rules relating to applicable labor conditions are less clear.237 When the EIB 
gives loans the loans may finance projects which can create employment opportuni-
ties. The EIB requires compliance with EU policies by the borrower, but not all of these 
policies apply to non-EU-citizens.238 In fact, local conditions in the relevant African 
countries might apply subject to the EU standards.239 The EIB is as such obliged to 
control these investments.240 The EIB uses an internal framework to examine if a pro-
ject is consistent with its economic and social standards, which are based on the 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union.241 This guideline however 
an internal document and does not directly apply to the borrower.242 But the EIB de-
clared to finance no projects which could violate human rights.243 
The general programs of the EU contains no concrete labor standards but only 
refers the human rights demand for the project realization in its regulations as the gen-
eral condition even when they promote certain labor rights like decent work or gender 
equality.244 The demand for human rights is as already stated (see 2.2.4.) in the Coto-
nou Agreement but it also state to respect of basic labor rights like the freedom of as-
sociation or collective bargaining.245 The parties of the CA reaffirmed the core labor 
conventions of the International Labor Organization (“ILO”).246 The core convention 
are for instance the Minimum Age Convention or the Forced Labor Convention.247 
But the CA as a preferential trade agreement does not aim to directly regulate 
labor according to the EDF completing the aid projects. The acknowledgement of the 
ILO core labor conventions is subjected to the chapter of “Trade related areas”. It is 
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therefore used more for labor through the trade and economic cooperation.248 Regard-
less, the EDF is subject to the CA and those standards also apply for contractors who 
complete the aid projects when the African country has implemented the conventions. 
In addition, they aim to strengthen labor reforms and exchange information.249 
In terms of article 24 of Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement direct labor operations 
have to be implemented by agencies or departments of the African countries while 
complying with the rules and standards laid down by the EU. And if disputes arise be-
tween the host-country and the contractor, national or arbitrational procedures will be 
implemented. 
Overall, the EU does not directly set labor conditions but rather focuses on gen-
eral human rights compliance, however, through the Cotonou Agreement it is able to 
raises the standards set by the ILO core labor conventions. So, it is expected that 
these are implemented into the national laws of the African country.  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the EU legal framework and its terms and conditions for 
development aid in Africa (and other developing countries). The EU which has specific 
programs and the EDF which finances projects seek to strengthen certain values like 
human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and socio-economic and cultural 
development through these programs and projects.  
However, in order to access these programs or implement their own projects 
through the EDF, the recipient countries have to acknowledge, promote and imple-
ment these values. The EU believes on these values as a catalyst for sustainable de-
velopment. Besides the grants and concessional loans for the programs provided the 
EDF, the European Investment Bank also assist and also provides loans to African 
countries. 
The EU has implemented its own procedural framework called PRAG for the 
tendering process of EU aid projects. PRAG is which is overseen by an EU official in 
each ACP-country. The labour standards which apply to projects are human rights 
 
248 Chapter 5 “Trade related areas” CA. 





standards and the core labour standards promulgated the ILO conventions under pro-
jects of the CA.  
 
3. Chapter: Chinas Legal Framework for Investments in Africa 
3.1. Introduction 
The first chapter introduced China’s common historical background with Africa 
and also discussed its commercial interest in that continent. The structure of the previ-
ously discussed chapter followed its legal bases cannot use to introduce China’s In-
vestment Legal Framework. Chinese foreign relations are strongly policy driven, even 
when the legal system itself is influenced by the European continental legal system 
unfortunately a legal basis empowering Chinas government to invest or spend aid 
abroad was not found during the author’s research for this thesis.250 Besides these bi-
lateral investment agreements which deal with general or specific conditions are not 
publicly accessible.  
This chapter will investigate Chinese policies and laws which contain terms and 
conditions for the purposes of comparing access, tender and labor conditions for Chi-
nese investments in Africa. It will cover Chinas white paper for foreign aid, the One-
China principle, the going global strategy, economic policies which could influence 
those investments following China’s Africa policy, FOCAC and the Chinese Export-Im-
port Bank (Exim-Bank) which provides the loans to African countries and has a certain 
impact on the tendering process. The conditions which apply for the procurement and 
labor standards is investigated through short case studies below. 
 
3.2. China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid  
In April 2011 the Information Office of the State Council published the first white 
paper on China’s Foreign Aid which contains a lot of information.251 The paper empha-
sized in its preface that China has provided aid since the 1950s, without any political 
conditions to the recipient countries.252 Those recipient countries are developing coun-
tries like China.253 It also points out that it promoted the South-South cooperation 
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which is based, amongst others things on equality and mutual benefits, which is also 
emphasized in FOCAC and China’s white papers for Africa.254 
The paper is based on ‘The Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical 
Assistance to Other Countries’, introduced by the Chinese government in 1964.255 
Those principles are: (1) Equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other coun-
tries; (2) respecting the sovereignty of recipient countries without attaching conditions 
(no political strings attached) or asking for privileges.256 (3) China has the pace for the 
repayment of economic aid of interest-free or low loans and extends the time limit if 
necessary.257 Indeed, China did so in the past, most recently for Ethiopia.258 (4) The 
recipient countries shall become self-reliance and independent in their economic de-
velopment and not dependent on China.259 (5) China supports recipient countries in 
completing projects faster in order to receive their income.260 (6) The Chinese govern-
ment provides equipment and materials manufactured by China.261 (7) For technical 
assistance China ensures that the personnel of the recipient countries will be trained 
to use the technology.262 (8) Chinese dispatched experts will have the same standard 
of living as the experts of the recipient countries.263 With these principles the govern-
ment set itself a certain framework of how they wishes to provide assistance to other 
countries. However, as pointed out in section 1.7.3. China does however also have a 
commercial interest and seeks a mutual benefit in providing aid or finance. 
The paper states that the government studied the economic and long-term ef-
fects of aid. To make it more flexible and individualized for the recipient countries the 
paper espouses the use domestic capacities of the recipient countries to build up their 
economies with local personnel and technical forces.264 China offers tailored aid, if 
possible. Therefore, foreign aid is provided through bilateral agreements and not 
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through multilateral frameworks or certain programs.265 However, China acknowl-
edges reforms and innovations and uses its experiences of foreign aid to improve its 
work.266 
China provides foreign aid in eight different forms which are financed by finan-
cial instruments (section 1.7.3.) administered by the Ministry of Commerce.267 These 
are the following: (1) Complete projects for which China is fully or in part responsible 
in terms of planning, designing and realizing the project (for instance in the infrastruc-
ture sector) that is handed over to the recipient country when it is complete.268 (2) 
Goods and materials – for production and living but also single-item equipment, which 
is often delivered to complete projects to improve their equipment capacity.269 These 
first two types of aid referred to in (1) and (2) may also be provided in combination de-
pending on the project financed through grants or interest-free loans to the social sec-
tor (hospital or schools) or commercial loans for economically profitable projects (infra-
structure and manufacturing).270 (3) Technical cooperation which is provided through 
dispatched experts which give guidance on the production or maintenance of com-
plete projects, or train locals as technical personnel, for instance to grow crops.271 
(4) Human resource development cooperation to train government officials 
through education programs, technical training programs and also personnel ex-
change programs in sectors of the economy, agriculture, health care and environmen-
tal protection.272 One of China’s oldest forms of aid which was launched in 1963 is 
medical support.273 (5) Medical teams sent to recipient countries to provide free medi-
cal devices and medicines.274 (6) Volunteer programs which were established in 2002 
for young Chinese citizens who are sent to developing countries, like Ethiopia to serve 
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(7) Humanitarian aid in the form of materials, cash or the dispatch of relief per-
sonnel which is provided in emergencies when a country suffers from a natural or hu-
manitarian disaster.276 (8) Debt relief for interest-free loans provided to deeply in-
debted countries by China.277 China announced such reliefs during the FOCAC sum-
mits in 2000, 2006 and 2009 for some African countries.278 
In July 2014 China published its second policy on Foreign Aid which summa-
rizes China’s global assistance from 2010 to 2012.279 The white paper presents a 
broad overview of completed aid projects in social and economic sectors for that pe-
riod, however, no concrete data for specific projects was given.280 It emphasized the 
principles of non-interference, mutual benefits, win-win and the independence of 
choosing a development model.281 In the conclusion of the policy paper China pledges 
to continue its development cooperation with the world.282 No additional foreign papers 
have been released, which could provide more information in relation to about China’s 
global aid engagements and contribution. The Chinese government might publish 
more data and studies through the new agency CIDCA.283 
 
3.3. The One-China Principle as a pre-condition 
To get access to financial assistance as described in section 1.7.3. and such 
aid programs described in the previous section, African countries must have diplo-
matic relations with China.284 The One-China principle requires that the African coun-
tries not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state.  
This issue goes back to the civil war in China in the 1940s, where the com-
munist party gained control of the mainland and the dissidents fled to the island of Tai-
wan. The government of Taiwan subsequently claimed to be a sovereign state and es-
tablished a democratic government, which was broadly recognized by the international 
community until 1979 when the UN withdrew their recognition of Taiwan espoused the 
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principles of a democratic society and has the view that its citizens have to choose if 
they want to reunify with China.285  
When China proclaimed its communist constitution in 1949 it laid down in the 
preamble the aim for a peaceful reunification with Taiwan.286 The Chinese communist 
party understands itself as the legitimate government for mainland China but also for 
the island of Taiwan. The mention of the One-China principle in the constitution em-
phasized the importance for China of a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Besides 
this, the principle is mentioned in China’s Africa policies discussed below. 
There are however still countries which acknowledge the sovereignty of Taiwan 
which assists with providing the country with a voice in the international community.287 
On the other side China tries to convince these countries to acknowledge China’s 
rights claim to Taiwan. When the first FOCAC in 2000 only 44 of over 54 African coun-
tries were part of the forum.288 African countries which acknowledged the sovereignty 
of Taiwan were not invited to the forum. Nevertheless, China kept dialogue open with 
the countries and tried to convince them to withdraw their recognition of Taiwan’s sov-
ereignty and acknowledge China’s claim by dangling prospective investments.289  
In 2012, four African countries. namely Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Swaziland 
(now Eswatini) and Sao Tomé and Principe, still has diplomatic relations with the gov-
ernment of Taiwan.290 China sought consultations with those four countries and at-
tempted to entice them by offering similar investments like the other FOCAC recipi-
ents.291 As a consequence of Chinas efforts, the Gambia recalled its relations with Tai-
wan in 2016 and recognized China instead.292 Since then, the Gambia and China 
agreed to their partnership and China supports the Gambia with investments in infra-
structure projects.293 Sao Tomé and Principe had diplomatic relations with China until 
1997. Between 1997 and 2016 Sao Tomé and Principe had diplomatic relations with 
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Taiwan which is why China discontinued its relations with term. These diplomatic rela-
tions were restored in 2016 when Sao Tomé and Principe withdraw its recognition for 
Taiwan.294 In May 2018 Burkina Faso reestablished its ties with China by withdrawing 
its diplomatic relations with Taiwan.295  
53 African countries were represented at the 2018 FOCAC summit which dis-
cussed economic cooperation between China and the African continent. Most recently 
China held consultations with Eswatini in August 2018, short before the latest FOCAC 
summit.296 However, Eswatini has rejected China offers so far and it is the last country 
on the African continent with diplomatic relations to Taiwan.297 
For China the One-China policy is a fundamental requirement for diplomatic re-
lations with other countries.298 Therefore, this precondition is mentioned in both Chi-
nese Africa policies from 2006 and 2015.299  
 
3.4. The Going Global strategy and the Outbound Investment Regulation 
Besides governmental investments China’s companies also seek investment 
opportunities abroad. President Deng Xiaoping opened China for foreign investors in 
1978. Since then China’s economy has developed and grown even stronger. The Chi-
nese economy which is strongly controlled by the government did however become 
limited in terms of its growth within its domestic market by the end of the 1990s. As a 
consequence the government published a policy named “going global strategy” in 
1999.300 This policy encouraged Chinese companies, which are mostly state-owned 
and some non-state-owned companies to move abroad and invest in the booming 
world economy (outbound direct investments).301 Because of the growing economy 
the production of goods in China became more and more expensive. Wages for the 
Chinese employees are increasing significant, moving China away from a low-cost 
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country.302 The policy guided them to find markets and resources, using business 
practices that worked in China, albeit, the outcome varied.303  
In March 2018 the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) renewed the law for outbound investments by the Administrative Measures 
for Overseas Investments by Enterprises.304 The regulations for outbound investments 
have been in place since the 1990s.305 This regulation requires that Chinese compa-
nies (state-owned and private-owned), joint-ventures in host-countries which are con-
trolled by a Chinese majority and individuals should register their planned outbound 
investment and get approval from authorities.306 State-owned enterprises have even 
more requirements to fulfil in order to get approval.307 This section will be focus only 
on the process. The process is different depending on the type of investment.  
A distinction is made between investments categorized as sensitive and non-
sensitive. The investments are also categorized according to their transaction value. 
The NDRC lists sensitive countries, with which China limited or no diplomatic rela-
tions, and industries which need an approval. On the sensitive list of industries are ho-
tels, sports clubs or entertainment companies.308 Investments supporting the Belt and 
Road Initiative, which will be explained below (section 3.5.3.), are classified as not 
sensitive anymore and are in the renewed regulation.309 For a sensitive investment an 
approval from the NDRC and the Ministry of Finance and Commerce is always re-
quired. A notification must be filed online; in case a non-sensitive investment includes 
credits or guarantees from a Chinese company to the relevant African countries. And, 
if the transaction value for a non-sensitive investment is higher than $US 300 million 
the investor must submit an investment report. However, if the transaction value is 
less than $US 300 million an investment in a non-sensitive industry must just be noti-
fied without further process.310  
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These rules aim to increase the competitiveness of Chinese investors abroad 
and to minimize uncontrolled capital outflows.311 Domestic regulation affects Chinese 
investors in a procedural way. However, an approval can take up to two years, de-
pending on the type of investment. A potential African country seeking investment 
from any Chinese company should therefore consider whether it would meet the rele-
vant criteria set throughout the approval process. 
 
3.5. China’s policies and initiatives for economic growth  
Chinas economic policies should guide its economy to growth. For instance, the 
reform of the outbound investment regulation discussed in the previous section is 
based on the 13th Five-Year Plan.312 Some policies also show an impact on Africa. 
The most important policies will as such be examined on their potential impact and re-
quirements for investments in Africa. Beginning with the coordinating 13th Five-Year 
Plan, which introduced the policy Made in China 2025 and finally the One Belt One 
Road Initiative (BRI). 
 
3.5.1. 13th Five-Year Plan 
The Chinese Five-Year plan is an administrative social and economic plan gov-
erning the national budget and resources for future development.313 Those plans are 
known as economical instruments in socialist countries.314 The first plan was pub-
lished in 1953 some years after the adoption of the constitution of the People’s Repub-
lic of China. Since then almost every five years the Chinese government has pub-
lished a new plan. The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of 
the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020) which was adopted in March 2016, is the 
latest Five-Year Plan of China.315 This plan has a “development philosophy” that 
should drive China for more “innovation”, “coordination”, “green” (sustainable), “open-
ing up” by going global and engage with the global economy for mutual benefits, and 
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“share” the benefits of development with the people.316 The aim of mutual benefits is 
based on early principles of China like the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and 
Technical Assistance to Other Countries (see section 3.2.). The plan establishes the 
agenda for reforms and projects for the economy, like the reform of the outbound law. 
Besides its development philosophy it integrates and coordinates other national poli-
cies in its plan too.  
Chinese aid for developing countries is briefly discussed in Chapter 53 of the 
Five-Year Plan but does not make reference to Africa. In this chapter China promises 
to improve its aid and offer more skill trainings.317 Looking forward to expand, China 
seeks foreign cooperation in science, technology, environmental governance and 
some other sectors.318 Besides this China plans to implement the United Nations 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development and is part of UN peacekeeping mission com-
bating terrorism.319  
 
3.5.2. Made in China 2025 
One of those policies, mentioned in the Five-Year plan, is the Made in China 
2025 policy.320 This policy aims to develop China’s economy in to an innovation driven 
manufacturing economy and with quality at the heart of its brand.321 In terms of this 
policy China aims to become a high-end equipment producer in ten sectors, and pro-
duce, amongst other things for rail equipment, modern agricultural machinery, medical 
equipment and chemical machinery. The Five-Year plan sets out how to develop, pre-
sent and secure the quality of relevant goods through engaging enterprises.322  
The aim of this policy is to overcome the middle-income-trap.323 For this pur-
pose, China wants to improve its industry so that it is advanced and has the capacity 
to provide innovative productions. It plans to even surpass Western industries.324 This 
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is part of the reason Chinese companies sought to acquire innovative high-tech tech-
nology.325 This led to Western countries accusing China of intellectual property theft 
and violating WTO rules.326 Western companies now have to compete with Chinese 
companies when in order to succeed.327 It can therefore be expected that China will 
offer African countries new industrialized goods in the future. Low-wage industries like 
the textile industry which were important for China in the last decade have already 
shifted to other Asian countries.328 Some companies have even moved to Africa.  
 
3.5.3. One Belt One Road Initiative 
One further important economic initiative mentioned in the Five-Year Plan is the 
BRI which aims to connect countries and regions in multiple sectors through transport 
infrastructure.329 Africa is mentioned only once explicitly in the Five-Year Plan, when 
reference is made the BRI.330 The BRI was launched in September 2013 by Chinese 
president Xi Jinping. The initiative was based on the ancient Silk Road which con-
nected Asia, Europe and Africa through several sea and land routes.  
It aims to strengthen the global economy through “peace, development, cooper-
ation and mutual benefit”.331 In its principles the initiative states that it is open to every 
country and international and regional organizations.332 The economic cooperation 
aims to provide “exchanges and mutual learning between different civilizations” along 
the routes.333 Indeed, the initiative helps China to open up its economy even further 
under its policies mentioned above.334 Moreover, it seeks to strengthen its cooperation 
on energy, resources and production chains as it does already in Africa.335  
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The BRI uses regional cooperation and economic integration to push the initia-
tive forward.336 However, cooperation with China based on bilateral relations. The initi-
ative will integrate each country’s development strategy and coordinate the project 
through consultations to satisfy all interests.337 To achieve this ambitious plan, China 
offers most countries loans for railways and other infrastructure projects to build the 
belt and road. It also seeks to attract international capital to finance these initiatives.338  
China has become the biggest trading partner for the African continent and the 
BRI will facilitate the transportation of goods.339 The BRI links Africa and China via Af-
rica’s east coast, through ports like Djibouti and others. But it is not only east African 
countries that benefit from or are engaged with the BRI. Since the FOCAC supports 
the implementation of the BRI in Africa, China announced a Belt and Road Africa in-
frastructure development fund, worth $US 1 billion.340 It is worth noting that there ex-
ists strong engagement between East-African countries when it came to inter-conti-
nent connections. Especially through railway links, like the first African electric railway 
from Addis Ababa to Djibouti, where Chinas maritime silk road enters Africa.341 These 
projects were made possible mostly through investments by Chinese companies and 
with new concessional loans to African countries. 
Consequently, none of the Five-Year Plan, Made in China 2025 or the BRI have 
any legal requirements for investments in Africa. However, they show how China is 
developing its economy and seeking new investment opportunities in Africa. 
 
3.6. China’s Africa policies 
Even in instances where China does not mentioned Africa in its general eco-
nomic policies and infrastructure initiatives in Africa policies it discusses its interests 
and aims on the continent in its two Africa policies.  
In 2006 China presented its first Africa policy with objectives and steps on how 
to achieve these objectives in Africa.342 The policy was used to guide the development 
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of China-Africa relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence.343 The policy empha-
sizes the independent choice of types of development for African countries.344 Com-
paring part IV of the Africa policy with the FOCAC action plan from 2006, it is clear 
that most of the objectives in the Africa policy are similar to or are the same as objec-
tives in the FOCAC action plan.345 Action plans in the sense of FOCAC are joint state-
ments of Chinese and African countries setting common interests for socio-economic 
cooperation and investments in the future. 
The One-China principle (section 3.3) is seen as the foundation for China’s re-
lations with African countries. The Africa policy does however state that economic as-
sistance will be provided without any political strings being attached.346 This may be 
understood as a hint to western donor countries and international organizations who 
expect political or economic reforms. The One-China principle and investments with-
out political strings requirement were confirmed in the second Africa policy.347 
The second Africa policy was published in December 2015 by the Chinese gov-
ernment at the end of the sixth FOCAC summit. The paper recognized the full imple-
mentation of the first African policy whilst emphasizing the need for each other and the 
compatibility of their development strategies.348 Like the first policy it contains much of 
the FOCAC action plan from 2015, although this time it was published later then the 
action plan. The policy discusses several points which are broader than the first policy 
or the action plan and just states its intentions to cooperate with Africa. 
 
3.7. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
Shortly after China started promoting outbound investments to its domestic en-
terprises, the Forum on China-African Cooperation was launched by China and 44 Af-
rican countries in Beijing in 2000.349 At the present 53 African countries are part of the 
China-Africa exclusive forum.350 It is a diplomatic forum to facilitate investment deals 
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for social and economic development for the members who have common fundamen-
tal interests.351 Consequently, China requires diplomatic relations between the rele-
vant member African country and itself (see section 3.3 and 3.6).352  
Every three years FOCAC adopts a so-called “Action Plan” for which China 
pledges a certain amount of money. In the recent FOCAC action plan China pledged 
$US 15 billion for grants, zero-interest loans and concessional loans, $US 20 billion of 
commercial credit lines, $US 15 billion for funds like the China-Africa Development 
Fund for equity investments in Africa and $US 10 billion for Chinese companies.353 In 
those plans FOCAC members agree to cooperate in different sectors, for social and 
economic development and peace, especially in those sectors where Africa needs in-
vestments.354 However, this cooperation shall be based on “mutual benefit” through 
“Win-Win-Cooperation”, which is emphasized in each action plan since, consequently 
China’s interests are expressed too.355  
The recent Action Plan of 2018 and former plans start off by reviewing and con-
firming statements of the improvement of their relations and cooperation.356 But they 
also recognize further initiatives like Chinas Belt and Road Initiative (section 3.5) or 
the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement.357 They also announce 
new initiatives. In section 1.8 of the recent action plan China announced the launch of 
eight major initiatives to promote industrial growth, infrastructure connectivity, green 
development, trade facilitation, capacity building, health care, people-to-people ex-
change and a peace and security initiative.358 Those initiatives are financed through 
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the budget China provides.359 The aim is to strengthen a closer China-Africa commu-
nity.360 For instance on industrial promotion the Chinese government will promote Chi-
nese companies to invest in Africa even more.361  
The action plans are not very clear regarding programs or projects. But the 
types of investments and aid projects are given are stated in Chinas Foreign Aid policy 
(section 3.2). Unlike in previous action plans no debt relief is granted under the most 
recent Action Plan. China’s volunteer program was introduced in the third action plan, 
dispatching young volunteers to African countries to work in medicine, education and 
other fields.362 Medical teams have been sent to African countries since the first Action 
Plan, for instance to Uganda and Tanzania.363 Humanitarian aid is not always men-
tioned, in the 2018 plan China provided a budget for food assistance and send agricul-
ture experts to Africa.364 
To develop human resources the action plans for instance promote the educa-
tion sector through scholarships and exchange programs.365 Besides this they also 
aim to strengthen their cooperation in the science and technology sector through the 
exchange of information, experience and knowledge transfer.366 Since the third FO-
CAC action plan China has sent experts from the agricultural sector to provide tech-
nical assistance, build up local capacities and transfer technology to Africa.367  
Many of the cooperation’s described above, were not part of the first action plan 
from 2000. The cooperation expanded over time and the plans became broader 
reaching into more and more fields. When it started in 2000 the action plan focused a 
lot more on trade and investments, as China had just released its ‘going global strat-
egy’ pushing its companies out to invest abroad (section 3.4). The forum was a way to 
facilitate investment and trade opportunities. 
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Still this is the larger part of each plan. By building industries, the partners 
agree to industrialize African countries through projects and through creating special 
economic zones and industrial parks.368 Bilateral investment treaties and other mecha-
nisms shall be renewed and concluded to reduce investment barriers.369 The eco-
nomic cooperation of the action plan contemplates utilizing infrastructure projects in 
the air transport and the communication and information sector to strengthen connec-
tivity in Africa.370 Moreover, both sides agree to raise their imports and exports through 
market access, modernize the customs services and regulations.371 China promises to 
extend concessional loans and find new financing models to facilitate all the coopera-
tion mentioned above.372 This means there could be further projects to be completed 
through investment packages which also could contain Chinese materials. 
The wording of those plans is kept very vague and general and there are no 
concrete details on what the parties concerned will agree on. Furthermore, the plans 
are not legally binding on the parties. Specific projects are not named in the Action 
Plans and reference is not to who should implement these projects.373 Therefore, 
China concludes with each African state bilateral treaties for those investments and 
cooperation projects.374 
 
3.8. China’s Investment Agencies  
China uses its agencies to realize all the different investments and the transfers 
of budgets. The Agricultural Development Bank of China, China Development Bank 
and Exim-Bank are China’s policy banks which execute state policies locally and inter-
nationally.375 Such policies are discussed above. In addition the agency CIDCA has 
since April 2018 granted concessional and interest-free loans ($US 15 billion and 
above) for the period of 2019-2021 only to African sovereign recipients.376 Until 1995, 
Chinas foreign aid was only provided in the form of grants and no-interest loans for 
 
368 FOCAC Action Plan 2018, section 3.2.2, 3.2.4. 
369 FOCAC Action Plan 2018 section 3.7.2 
370 FOCAC Action Plan 2018 section 3.3.2 to 3.3.8. 
371 Ibid section 3.8.1, 3.8.3, 3.8.6, 3.8.7. 
372 Ibid section 3.9.1. 
373 See for instance FOCAC Action Plan 2018 section 3.2.3: “various projects”; or section 3.2.5. “African coun-
tries”. 
374 White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid (21.04.2011).  
375 Paper of Friends of the Earth United States “China Development Bank and China Export-Import Bank” (Janu-
ary 2016) 11. 





construction work through the existing financial channels.377 However, the execution of 
the China-Africa Development Fund, other funds and commercial loans remain under 
the control of the policy banks which are controlled by the Ministry of Commerce.378 
The following section described how the Exim-Bank provides commercial loans and 
how it previously provided concessional loans. 
In 1995 China began to offer concessional loans through the Exim-Bank which 
is a state-owned bank established in 1994.379 The Exim-Bank is one of the most active 
Chinese banks in Africa but also in the BRI which provides countries with loans.380 
Those loans come often as “packaged financing” of political and economic coopera-
tion, aid, investments, concessional loans, cooperation on exports but also exchange 
programs.381 Consequently CIDCA is now involved in such transactions. 
To receive a commercial loan African countries have to submit a request to the 
Exim-Bank.382 One of the prerequisites for approval of the loan is that the relevant Afri-
can country has to be compliant with the One-China principle (section 3.3).383 Before 
signing a framework agreement the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) evaluates the 
request. Then the Exim-Bank determines the interest rate of the loan through a risk 
analysis process.384 Once the project is completed, the (mostly Chinese) contractors 
present their invoices to the relevant African host-country, which passes them onto the 
Exim-Bank for payment.385 The African governments pay their loan and interest to the 
Exim-Bank.386 By using this procedure the Exim-Bank supports the fight against cor-
ruption.387  
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To backup and secure loans provided by Exim-Bank African countries some-
times provide certain mining rights to Chinese companies which entitle them to mine 
natural resources (“the Angola Model”).388 The revenue from the raw minerals is used 
to repay the relevant loan(s).389 If a project is completed the Exim-Bank is in charge of 
assessing results while other aid forms, like technical cooperation, are implemented 
and assessed by CIDCA.390 
Loans are used for instance for infrastructure projects, procuring mechanical 
and electrical products or for completing plants which provides African countries with 
economic and social benefits.391 The policy for social responsibility of the Exim-Bank 
is not available on its official website although it is mentioned in the Exim-Bank 2018 
annual report.392 The bank stated in its 2018 annual report that it “served the real 
economy, promoted balanced development among regions”, but is concentrated on 
local counties.393 The policy exists since 2004 and requires that the relevant borrower 
comply with local laws of a recipient country, however, their standards and procedures 
are not publicly available.394  
 
3.9. Case Studies for Procurement and Labor Conditions 
The previous sections of this chapter provided an overview of China’s invest-
ment policies. It noted that the One-China principle has to be adhered to in order to 
get access to Chinese loans and investments.395 To frame the applicable legal condi-
tions further this section will focus on the procurement and labor conditions relating to 
Chinese investments in Africa. As implied in section 1.7.3. Chinese commercial loans 
and concessional loans are often indistinguishable and as such it can be presumed 
that the same procurement and labor conditions apply to both types of loans. To in-
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3.9.1. Procurement Conditions for Chinese Investments in Africa 
It has already been espoused above that in terms of China’s Foreign Aid white 
paper China offers aid in various forms or projects which are complete or in parts 
through Chinese companies. Due to their commercial interests’ Chinese companies 
go abroad and seek as many contracts as possible. As an example Huawei a Chinese 
tech-company and a Sierra Leone state-own telecom company negotiated the exten-
sion of telephone infrastructure in 2006.396 Later the Sierra Leone government re-
quested a concessional loan from the Exim-Bank, which was issued and the contract 
was awarded to Huawei.397 In 2007 Ghana signed an Engineering, Procurement and 
Construction agreement which was linked to a concessional loan of the Exim-Bank to 
build the Bui Dam which was contracted out to a Chinese construction company to 
build.398 
One of the most prominent examples are the investment loans and construction 
contracts provided for Angola.399 After the end of a long civil war Angola needed loans 
to rebuild its infrastructure which were provided by China for the first time in 2004.400 
The loan has a concessional interest rate and was repayable in oil.401 As a result An-
gola became one of China’s biggest oil suppliers. The agreement between Angola and 
China involved over thirty contracts relating to construction work in the infrastructure, 
energy, education and communication sectors.402 A second loan accompanied by ad-
ditional contracts was provided by China to Angola in 2007.403 A major condition for 
these investment agreements was that the relevant projects had to be completed by 
Chinese companies.404 This however had to be within the limits set by Angolan laws 
which required that at least 30 per cent of the contracts had to be awarded to domes-
tic companies.405  
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There was a condition for many loans that 70 per cent of the underlying projects 
had to be contracted to Chinese companies, while the remaining 30 per cent had to be 
contracted to locals as it happened in Angola.406 Kenya benefited from Chinese loans 
provided for several construction projects, which were implemented primarily by Chi-
nese contractors.407 
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) a similar agreement was 
backed by raw-materials, like in Angola which became famous under the Angola-
model, was signed in 2007.408 The DRC negotiated that Chinese contractors had sub-
contract 10 to 12 per cent of contracts to Congolese firms.409  
The practices described above are used by the Exim-Bank which provides con-
cessional loans to African countries on the condition that Chinese contractors are 
awarded the underlying tenders or contracts.410 In such instances the number and 
value of contracts which may be obtained by Chinese companies is dependent on the 
limits set by domestic laws (i. e. Angola) or what is negotiated between the parties. 
Moreover, MOFCOM which is involved in the loan provision process tender the Chi-
nese contractor which will implement the relevant investment project, presumably un-
der the auspices of Chinese procurement law.411 Chinese companies which wish over-
seas must as such first be approved by the Chinese government (section 3.4).412 An-
other requirement to obtain the loan is that at least 50 per cent of the equipment, ma-
terials, technology or services used for the project must be made in China.413 
Other than the above-mentioned condition the Chinese government also pro-
vides an alternative way to support its companies. Where there is a formal tendering 
process in the local country for a contract, for example, the Chinese government will 
subsidise the tendering company so that its bid price is 30 per cent lower than the 
other competitors for tender.414 However, these subsidies are not a condition set 
within the legal framework for the investments, the condition is set in the loan so as to 
enable the awarding of the contract to Chinese companies. 
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3.9.2. Labor Standards in Chinese Investments in Africa 
A Chinese company in charge of completing parts or all of a project has to be 
comply with the labor standards which are required by domestic laws of the host-coun-
try and those required by any investment agreements that may apply. It is difficult to 
discern what labor standards are imposed by these investment agreements as the in-
vestment agreements are not made public. 
African countries also regulate foreign investments through bilateral investment 
treaties. Many African countries have such BITs with China, however, none of these 
BITs regulate labor related issues.415 The parties do not set labour conditions in the 
investment agreement and as such the contracted Chinese company has to comply 
with labour conditions set by domestic laws and regulations.416 The Exim-Bank for in-
stance contemplates its social responsibility assessment of a contractor that the con-
tractor is aware of local laws, which implies that there are no labour standards that are 
set by the Chinese government in these cases.417  
Nevertheless, certain labour customs are recognized by Chinese companies in 
Africa. One of the most referenced cases that deal with labour standards involved a 
copper mine in Zambia that was reopened by Chinese state-owned company.418 In 
2005, fifty-one workers were killed in an explosion on the copper mine and the Chi-
nese state-owned company was heavily criticised to its lax safety standards.419 One 
year later Zambian workers on the mine protested for higher wages. The protest 
turned into a riot and a Chinese manager shot one protester dead and injured five oth-
ers.420 
In Ethiopia, China has built several factories to manufacture shoes and clothes. 
While the workers are Ethiopians the supervisors are primarily Chinese who try to con-
sider the cultural differences between Ethiopians and Chinese as well as the nuances 
of African labour culture.421 Local low-skilled worker in the construction industry have 
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no safety clothing and are not happy working the long hours demanded by Chinese 
supervisors.422 Language barriers between Chinese supervisors and local workers 
also cause conflicts.423 The activities by Chinese companies in Africa are not altruistic 
and are amongst other things, spurred on by cheap labour. While in China the aver-
age wage for a worker in the manufacturing sector is around 560 US$ per month the 
average wage for the same worker in Ethiopia is 30 US$.424  
Some Chinese companies also seem to focus more on substantive rights rather 
than on proceedings. In one case a local African employee was fired by a Chinese 
company that had not gone to the disciplinary enquiry commission to discuss the em-
ployee’s violation of company rules.425 Labour contracts are sometimes agreed ver-
bally which can cause further complications for instance there can be a misunder-
standing about whether an employee is hired for a probationary periods.426 Under 
southern African labour laws terms have to be written in a contract.427 
To summarize this section China does not set legal labour standards which are 
applicable to companies that tender to complete investment projects in Africa. But as 
these cases show Chinese companies violate local customs and are unfamiliar with 
local labour laws. 
 
3.10. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the Chinese legal framework and its terms and condi-
tions for investments in Africa. China offers some assistance to Chinese companies 
that tender to complete partial or full projects in Africa. However, different economic 
policies displayed its commercial interest sending Chinese companies abroad to in-
vest. Under the FOCAC Chinese government facilitates investments by offering grants 
and loans. The forum helps with tailoring China’s and Africa’s cooperation in promot-
ing socio-economic development. 
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In China’s early principles it bound itself to non-interference with local laws and 
standards. However, as seen in relation to the China and Taiwan conflict, China en-
forces the One-China principle. Compliance with the principle is a pre-condition to fos-
tering diplomatic relations with China and obtaining financial assistance from China. 
As noted above China used these incentives to convince countries not to 
acknowledge Taiwan’s sovereignty. 
The tendering process for investments and contracts is completed differently. 
Some Chinese companies negotiate contracts with African governments directly and 
others are awarded contracts with the help of Chinese financial agencies which pro-
vide loans to relevant African governments as an incentive. 
If it is an investment package with different contracts China offers to complete 
all these contracts. Domestic laws in Africa usually require that a certain number of 
contracts are completed by local companies which is considered in the agreement or 
they are able to negotiate some contracts to locals. In completing these projects China 
does not set its own labour standards for the Chinese companies operating in Africa 
but rather the domestic labour laws of the host-countries apply. Chinese contracted 
companies are partly unfamiliar with local laws and customs which causes conflicts 
between employees and employers. 
 
Chapter 4: The Comparative Analysis of the Legal Frameworks for Investments 
in Africa by China and the European Union 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter is synthesizing the terms and conditions which were examined in 
the previous two chapters, which considered the historical, socio-economic and finan-
cial approaches explained in chapter one. After describing the method of analysis, the 
evaluation and comparison for each sub-question made in section 1.2. is given to find 
out which of these legal frameworks contains fairer conditions for investments to Afri-






4.2. The Method of Analysis  
Comparative law is its own discipline in law studies.428 Its main aim is to obtain 
knowledge through legal comparison.429 The variety of solution and approaches found 
in the different legal systems could provide the opportunity to find “better solutions” for 
a legal system under analyses.430 There are two main comparison approaches. The 
“macrocomparison” approach is done on the basis of researching methods which 
manage legal materials and procedures for resolving and deciding disputes.431 So, 
one can compare the technique of interpreting of the materials for instance.432 The 
other approach is “microcomparison” which focuses on concrete problems, legal solu-
tions and particular conflicts of interests.433 This approach compares for instance rules 
for the liability of a manufacturer for defective goods.434  These approaches however 
sometimes blur into each other when used simultaneously.435  
Using the macrocomparison approach would not reflect the actual impact of an 
investment project on an African country. The microcomparison approach is as such 
used to determine the conditions of the investments and the legal framework that 
could work for African countries. It is important that the relevant legal frameworks are 
examined through the lenses of domestic laws, bi- and multilateral contracts, which 
apply to the African countries. The methods of comparative law of, comparing different 
legal systems, can also be transferred to international law by comparing international 
treaty law.436 Treaties in the international context are a main source of international 
law.437 Comparative law as such helps also to interpret and compare international 
law.438  
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But there is no absolute set of established methodological principles.439 Each 
method has its limits and cannot cover everything.440 Moreover, there is doubt whether 
it is possible to find a logical and self-contained methodology which might work per-
fectly.441 There will always be areas of law where sound judgment, common sense, or 
intuition can help.442 In addition to that the critical criterion mostly might be the practi-
cal evidence.443 
The basic method is that of functionality, therefore comparable rules must have 
the same function.444 The functional method should reflect the purpose of a rule which 
provides a standard that can evaluate how well this rule serve its purpose.445 The pur-
pose of the rules helps to interpret the rules.446 However, the result of the comparison 
can lead to the decision that neither rule is the best because both have their ad-
vantages and disadvantages or that another rule is better than the other.447 This 
method works when different legal systems are used to try to solve the same problem 
or matter.448  
The system for the comparison follows a simple structure and must be flexible 
enough to consider different approaches to same issue.449 Each of the following three 
sections will start with a description of how the legal frameworks discussed in chapter 
two and three should be applied. Regarding the sub-questions in section 1.2. the eval-
uation will point out the purpose of the rules imposed by the legal framework and if it 
functions well in African countries. This will be followed by a critical comparison of the 
two counterparts. The conclusion could be that one set of rules is better, equal to or 
worse that the other set of rules.450 The decisive argument often might be a political, 
historical or economic one.451 
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Consider for example a fictious case in which a certain African country wishes 
to apply for investments or aid and it considers aid or investment loan from the EU or 
China. The money received will be used for a project to build a highway through eco-
nomic centers. This case is used to demonstrate how the different frameworks will 
work. After detailing the used case the following section will show the frameworks may 
be applied and conclude by a comparing the different results. 
 
4.3. Access to aid-investments through political conditions 
4.3.1. Applying for investments/ aid 
As a precondition an African country must first consider the rules when applying 
for investment loans. Following the EU framework, it must-submit its application to the 
European Commission and apply to a specific program, or signed the CA to access to 
the EDF. If  it has signed the CA, it must also submit its application also to the Euro-
pean Commission who acts on behalf of the EU.452 One requirement of the programs 
and the EDF is that the government of the applying country must protect and practice 
the following values that are non-negotiable for the EU: namely human rights, demo-
cratic principles and the rule of law.  
If an African country wishes to apply for investments from China, it first needs to 
establish diplomatic relations with China. In order to successfully obtain such invest-
ments, the applicant African country, amongst other things, may not acknowledge the 
sovereignty of Taiwan Once diplomatic relations with China have been established the 
relevant African country can apply for investment loans from one of China’s invest-
ment loan agency. The legal conditions applicable to a request for investment are pre-
sumably the same between different Chinese investment agencies. 
At first glance it seems as if these two rules are not comparable as both rules 
are alignments differently. However, if one considers both rules from an abstract per-
spective it becomes clear that both aim to demand a political decision from the African 
country. Therefore, the African country must to hold its acknowledgement of political 
commitment which otherwise causes the suspension of investment loans under both 
rules. However, while the Chinese rule requires a decision to receive investments, the 
EU rule demands development through the required rule and it sanctions violation of 
 





the rule.453 Both rules go back to constitutional beliefs or objectives of their respective 
legal systems. 
The sub-question is, how compatible are the required political conditions with 
African legal systems to get access financial assistance? For the purposes of compar-
ing these political conditions, the practical implementation is used as the indicator to 
determine the compatibility for African countries. As those rules demand a political de-
cision an evaluation can just be set out on the will of the governments of the African 
countries to implement or acknowledge these rules.  
 
4.3.2. Evaluation of the EU rule 
The purpose of demanding the rule of law, democracy and human rights is to 
promote these as the fundamental values of the EU which are stated in the main trea-
ties and regulations of the EU.454 The demand globally for democracy and good gov-
ernance started with the end of the Cold War, when international institutions began to 
promote these principles and development.455 The aforementioned three principles are 
interrelated.456 The evaluation will begin with a short overview of the development con-
cept followed by the evaluation of each of the three principles.  
a. The development concept assumes that a country will develop better when 
countries implement these three principles. This view is also stated in article 9 of the 
Cotonou Agreement where the values are noted as being “integral part of sustainable 
development.”.457 
In order for sustainable development to occur there must be an effective and le-
gitimate government based on legitimacy.458 A government will gain legitimacy if it is 
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democratically elected, which is why pluralistic political structures are needed.459 A pri-
vate economy is able to effectively engage with an elected government as well as ar-
ticulate its interests and keep the political discourse alive by demanding accountabil-
ity.460 A government gains further legitimacy complying with laws and regulations.461 
There is a strong link between corruption and poverty, which can be reduced through 
transparent proceedings and accountability of the relevant government.462 An inde-
pendent judicial system can combat corruption through implementing laws on procure-
ment and transparency.463 The judiciary also protect human rights and secure property 
rights to ensure a return on investments.464  
The success of development through implementing these principles can be 
seen in role models like Ghana and Mauritius.465 Both African countries are democra-
cies who developed their economy with an accountable government and by privatizing 
their economies.466 However, many African countries have difficulties in implementing 
these principles. 
b. The rule of law should be implemented and provide a system of justice to en-
force human rights and protect democratic principles and there should be checks and 
balances of governmental powers.467 Even where the CA sets out the requirement for 
the rule of law a clear definition of what this concept means is missing.468 Certainly, 
the EU applies to external agreements in quiet similar understanding of the rule of law 
as it does internally.469 The EU is bound by its own laws and principles which makes it 
impossible to deviate from its own standards.470 
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The rule of law entails, amongst other things as stated in the CA, transparency 
and accountability of the government.471 Frankly, many African countries resist imple-
menting the rule of law, despite the fact that this is crucial for attracting external invest-
ments and achieving the benefits of trade and integration with the international econ-
omy.472 
The demand for the rule of law is a demand for accountability, as well-defined 
property rights to secure private (including foreign direct) investments.473 To prove ac-
countability African countries need transparent structures which reduces corruption. 
Many African countries have implemented laws and regulations against corruption and 
adopted the regional African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corrup-
tion and the international UN Convention against Corruption.474 Data from Transpar-
ency International shows that the majority of countries in the world have improved little 
or not at all in the fight against corruption in the last eight years.475 The average score 
for western Europe and the EU is 66 which makes it to the best performing region 
even though it is not immune to corruption.476  
If for instance one compares this score with Sub-Saharan Africa, which has an 
average score of 32 (and is therefore one of the most inactive world-regions in the 
fight against corruption) it is obvious that some African countries fail in implementing 
this aspect of the rule of law.477 In many African countries public officials and elites 
have monopoly positions and lack the will to fight corruption which is supported 
through political instability and inefficient bureaucracy.478  
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c. Democracy is promoted by the EU as one of their values but it is accepted 
that democratic countries do not go to war with each other.479 Democracy is therefore 
a strategy for security and peace which is another interest of the EU.480 Furthermore, 
the promotion of democratic principles manifests the universal appeal of human rights 
and legitimate the actions of public authority.481 Although, African countries commit 
themselves to a democratization process to obtain aid by signing the CA or subject 
themselves to programs many of these countries do not comply with democratic prin-
ciples.482   
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index covers the worldwide state 
of democracy. The index shows that Africa has with Mauritius just one full democracy 
just 4.5 per cent of the world population live in such a democracy.483 The broad major-
ity of governments are still authoritarian regimes.484 The other are flawed democracies 
or hybrid regime, a mix of authoritarian and democratic structures.485 The index shows 
that there have been small developments that have improve democracies in Africa in 
the last decade which have however degraded.486 
There are several reasons for the weak transition to democratic governments. 
For instance, many countries were unwilling to effectively implement democratic prin-
ciples and good governance when it was first time negotiated.487 Another aspect is the 
disagreement between the EU and ACP-countries on a definition of democracy.488 
Moreover, African communities are less familiar with democratic principles and trust 
more autocratic regimes than a periodically changing government.489 Some countries 
which have democratic values have no free press so the government can use propa-
ganda its interests and stay in power over several elections which ends up looking like 
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an autocratic regime, for example in Zambia.490 Several African countries have had to 
make legal adjustments to strengthen democratic principles. 
d. Human rights should be protected through the rule of law and promoted 
through democratic principles. The demand for human rights for the economic cooper-
ation to provide aid is still criticized by African countries. In the first FOCAC declara-
tion in 2000 African countries and China stated that the conditionality of human rights 
to provide economic assistance should be rejected and constitute a violation on hu-
man rights itself.491 In the same year the CA was signed. The basis of the argument by 
African countries is that this requirement infringes on their sovereignty and that this 
can be seen as foreign domination of African countries. The latter argument is espe-
cially sensitive because African countries obtained their independence from former co-
lonial European countries only a few decades ago.492 The former colonies of the Euro-
pean powers are therefore suspicious of the concept of human rights that is developed 
by these former colonial powers.493 
When the Universal Declaration on Human Rights from 1948 was adopted in 
the UN General Assembly just four African countries were member of the UN. South 
Africa with its apartheid regime abstained from voting for the declaration.494 Most Afri-
can countries did however sign several of the eighteen UN human rights conven-
tions.495 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which cover the rights of the Uni-
versal Declaration on Human Rights are signed by nearly all African countries.496 Fur-
thermore, the Organisation of African Unity released the Banjul Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights which came into force 1986 and is signed by 53 African countries.497 
The Banjul Charter includes the typical civil and political rights, economic, social and 
cultural rights as well as the rights to development, a good environment and duties of 
the individual to the state, society and family which are unknown in western regional 
 
490 Ibid. 
491 Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation of the 10-12 October 2000, No 4, accessible at: 
https://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t606796.htm. 
492 Toby King “Human Rights in European Foreign Policy: Success or Failure for Post-modern Diplomacy?” (1999) 
European Journal of International Law 314. 
493 Ibid. 
494 Besides South Africa were Liberia, Ethiopia and Egypt member of the United Nations, since 1945. 
495 See https://indicators.ohchr.org/ 
496 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) are signed by all African countries, ex-
cept South Sudan, Mozambique and Botswana. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is except 
for South Sudan, signed by all African countries. 





human rights conventions.498 This shows that African countries accept normative hu-
man rights.  
As the criticism shows the interference by third parties like the EU in the do-
mestic affairs of African countries is, not welcomed. The prohibition of sovereign inter-
ference is broadly acknowledged in international law.499 However, a reinterpretation of 
this principle is given in the human rights field and interference is possible because Af-
rican countries which have signed relevant international treaties promoting human 
rights have subjected themselves to the protection and promotion of universal human 
rights.500 At least under the Banjul Charter African countries cannot argue that human 
rights is a foreign concept which they do not acknowledge, promote and protect. Addi-
tionally, by signing several international conventions they have subjected themselves 
to the international community which recognizes the prevention of human rights 
abuses as being in the interests of all nations and as being a matter of international 
concern.501 Also, they signed the Cotonou Agreement which allows the EU to sanction 
human rights violations.502 
e. Sanctions can be imposed on countries which violates one of the principles 
noted above. This is provided for in the CA. For a violation of the principles discussed 
above a political dialogue is given through article 96 CA. If the dialogue fails sanctions 
can be imposed as the last resort.503 The budget can then be disbursed to the popula-
tion or NGOs directly instead of the government.504 The EU has however imposed 
sanctions in the past. 
The imposition of sanctions should always be considered critically. First and 
foremost, sanctions must be applied consistently to all countries. The EC has not al-
ways imposed sanctions consistently. For example the EC sought to impose sanctions 
on Uganda for human rights violations while the EC maintained economic relations 
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with South Africa’s apartheid regime.505 Another example is where the EC had limited 
reaction to human rights violations in Nigeria on the Ogoni tribe in 1995.506 While the 
European Parliament called for an oil embargo the European Council feared an in-
crease in oil prices and took into account the interest of European companies like 
Shell and ultimately no embargo was placed.507 Finally during the genocide in Rwanda 
the European position was influenced by France’s ties to Rwanda which resulted in a 
common European position only being published when the genocide was over.508 
Even when the CA provides that there should be political dialogue prior to imposing 
sanctions, the decision whether to impose sanction on a country ultimately solely re-
lies on EU internal decisions. Those decisions are influenced by the economic or polit-
ical ties of EU member states to their former colonies.  
Sanctions for violations of democratic principles are also imposed differently. 
Countries like Uganda which function as a one-party state underwent economic re-
forms and did not lose their access to aid while being undemocratic.509 Another aspect 
which refuses the imposition of sanctions is that of security. As long as an autocratic 
regime provides peace in a given region or helps fight terrorism western donors in-
cluding the EU hold back on imposing sanctions on the relevant countries.510  
Frankly, there is a double standard in relation to some countries depending 
whether there are economic or strategic advantages for Europe.511 Consequently, the 
EU lacks coherency in applying her external policies regarding development assis-
tance, trade and security. The EU’s different interests often conflict with each other. 
In conclusion it can be said that the majority of African countries struggle with at 
least one of the three principles discussed above, even when the relevant legal rules 
are already in place existing. In the meantime, however, the EU does not use sanc-
tions strictly. The EU seems rather to be led by economic, diplomatic and security con-
siderations in deciding whether sanctions should be imposed.  
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4.3.3. Evaluation of Chinas rule 
Chinas condition is different to the EU’s rule discussed above. China has only 
one condition. The condition aims to achieve China’s constitutional aim of a peaceful 
unification with Taiwan. This serves only China’s own purpose. The Taiwanese popu-
lation rejects Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of “one country two systems” which will lead to 
a gradual unification.512 The recently democratically re-elected government of Taiwan 
keep it distance to mainland China.513  
The condition is used to isolate Taiwan completely and convince the last coun-
tries which acknowledge the sovereignty of Taiwan and are represented in the UN not 
to continue to do so.514 There are two theories in international law that deal with the 
recognition of states. The constitutive theory provides that a new state with legal per-
sonality is constituted through its recognition of other states.515 Taiwan would lose its 
legal personality if no other country recognizes it anymore. According to the declara-
tory theory a state is constituted through its own declaration which can be recognized 
through other states.516 This implies that a state can exist without any recognition by 
other states through its own declaration. In practice a combination of these theories is 
used and a state exists through the recognition of a constitutional act by other states 
which confirm basic requirements of being a state.517  
Consequently, when all countries reject Taiwan the status of it as a state must 
be questioned even more. The One-China principle itself has no legal impact on for-
eign legal systems. Frankly, it takes a political and economic decision by each govern-
ment.518 Thus, countries around the world must decide, if they will maintain diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan or with mainland China. Through this policy China has barred 
diplomatic relations with both governments. 
For the recognition of China with officially legal authority over the island Taiwan 
speaks the historical argument. Historically, the communist party won the civil war and 
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became the legal successor which is why the Taiwanese government is seen as ille-
gal.519 The people of the republic of China joined the United Nations in 1971 while Tai-
wan was rejected by of the organization. Many countries withdrew their recognition for 
Taiwan even the USA acknowledged the communist government as the official author-
ity in China during the Cold War. 520 
The economic decision needs a consideration of the benefits of diplomatic rela-
tions with one of those countries. Both offer aid and investments to their allies and 
trade relations.521 In the past, countries like Burkina Faso swapped relations choosing 
the best offer of financial and technical assistance several times.522 However, many 
countries who acknowledge China trade with Taiwan too. Even the industrialized na-
tions like the USA have economic but no diplomatic relations to Taiwan.523 So, trading 
with Taiwan is possible without official diplomatic relations whilst not fearing any sanc-
tions from mainland China. 
The practice shows that the condition is accepted by all African countries ex-
cept, Eswatini. This country decided to stay for “diplomatic and political morality” rea-
sons with Taiwan.524 They understand their ties with Taiwan as successful cooperation 
based on mutual respect, friendship and loyalty.525 Hence, Eswatini’s government re-
jects Chinas offers for aid and investments through diplomatic relations.526 Regard-
less, the rest of the continent has made the political decision to maintain diplomatic re-
lations with China and gather the associated benefits. 
 
4.3.4. Comparing 
The following evaluation will compare the EU rule which is poorly implemented 
in many of the African countries and is also weak enforced by the EU and Chinas rule 
which is confirmed by nearly all African states. The One-China principle is the prefera-
ble rule compared to the political strings attached to the EU framework. This view is 
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confirmed by a statement in the latest FOCAC Action Plan which states that the Afri-
can countries appreciate Chinas assistance without political conditions.527 It is interest-
ing to note that the rejection of Taiwan is not even recognized as a condition itself, 
even when the Chinese policies are mention.  
The requirement is accomplished through a one-time decision and serves only 
China’s own interest. The condition has no impact on Africa’s domestic legal or gov-
ernmental systems while the EU conditions require in most countries huge effort and 
willingness to comply with the condition. China solely expects a political decision to 
give access to its financial funds. Contrary to this the condition imposed by the expec-
tation of the EU is there should be transformation of the African countries to a govern-
ment and development model like that of the EU member states. In contrast to that 
China’s eight principles on economic aid interdict China to please other nations to 
adopt their political system. China merely shares its development experience and 
leaves it up to the relevant African countries to choose their own development.528 
The European development concept can be doubted. Research shows that the 
establishment especially of the rule of law and democratic principles alone guarantees 
no economic growth.529 Considerably more, needs is human capital to shape institu-
tional and productive capacities of a society.530 In addition to that it is impossible to 
convey concepts to other societies individually without considering historical, political 
and socio-economic circumstances.531 China itself is the perfect counter model to the 
Western development concept. It experienced with Mao Zedong one of the worst dic-
tators and for growth and with Deng Xiaoping one of the best.532  
Western critics argue that China would undermine the effectiveness of their ef-
forts developing Africa attaching no demand for Western values.533 However, research 
by the German Development Institute came to the conclusion that Chinas engagement 
in Africa has no to little impact on the development concept of the EU for Africa or aid 
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receiving countries.534 Furthermore, the demand by Western critics that China should 
also promote the rule of law, democracy and human rights misses the fact China’s un-
derstanding of these values differs to those of the West.535 For instance China is led 
by one party and other parties are subjected to that party.536 It is not very convincing 
demanding China to demand for these (EU) principles as well. This request for human 
rights amongst others would not comply with China’s principles of non-interference 
which is one of China’s basic principles for foreign relations. There will there basically 
be no change in the future.537  
However, even when Chinas governmental structures are different to Western 
countries, China started to privatize its economy slowly and Xi Jinping started the fight 
against corruption in its country. China also lacks transparency like most African coun-
tries however it is reforming the rule of law as part of the 13th Five-Year Plan.538 When 
China published the first Africa white paper, it reported some figures on former invest-
ments in Africa. Those figures where generalized and not very concrete. The EU pub-
lishes through its annual reports, data about its aid-spending which can help African 
communities to demand accountability from the EU but also from African govern-
ments.539 In contrast to the published details from the EU investments neither the 
MOFCOM nor the Exim-Bank release any public publication or data on their transac-
tions with African countries.540 Even the FOCAC does not report any details on its in-
vestments. Hence, it can be argued that the EU demand for more transparency is 
probably the most advantages aspect of its conditions. 
The critic on the demand of the EU conditions are however contrary to the am-
bitions of regional integration. Africa recognizes the benefit of regional and continental 
integration which is governed by democratic values, rule of law and good govern-
ance.541 However, the discontinuity of the EU sanctions for breaches of their condition 
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last negative too. Moreover, the sanctions often fail to influence the economic situation 
and rarely produce the intended effects.542 The EU’s conditionality is not consistent.543 
Countries which are considered by the EU as important for commercial or political pur-
pose generally suffer less or not at all from measures.544 
Lastly, it goes without saying that China’s condition relating to Taiwan will be-
come obsolete if Taiwan unites with mainland China. It can be assumed that the EU 
will, as it has done so in the past, included such conditions in future agreements.545 Af-
rican countries will have to consider whether they agree with those conditions and are 
able to keep the process alive. Thus, Chinas condition is not too complex and is easy 
to implement which is why it is better for and more compatible with all African govern-
ments. 
 
4.4. The implementation of the investment project – the procurement rules 
The previous section discussed the different conditions to access an investment 
loan or grant. This section will follow up with the fictitious case (see 4.2.) and evaluate 
and compare the rules which apply to tender for construction contracts financed 
through investment loans provided by the EU and China (see 2.3.1. and 3.9.1). 
 
4.4.1. the case 
In relation to the fictitious case the African country whose projects were ac-
cepted and the loan going to be issued has to tender the project through a public bid-
ding process.  
Under the EU framework the relevant African country has to tender the con-
tracts under the Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions 
(“PRAG”) framework. Consequently, the domestic procurement laws do not apply to 
the tender and in addition the process is supervised by an EU official. However, the 
EU Commission can exclude tenderers who made false declarations or are accused of 
fraud in previous bidding processes. 
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Chinese condition can be negotiated. China offers complete projects by Chi-
nese governments, however, if domestic laws apply or the host-country negotiate a 
certain amount of the contracts have to be tendered to local contractor the other to 
Chinese. The local contractor will be awarded under the procurement process of the 
host-country while for the Chinese contracts the Chinese ministry of commerce 
(MOFCOM) tendered the contracts to Chinese companies through Chinese domestic 
procurement laws. 
Both frameworks aim to procure contracts for companies which will complete 
the investment project in the host-countries. Through the same aim both rules can be 
well compared. In the evaluation the question is how are projects tendered under the 
legal frameworks? 
 
4.4.2. Evaluation of the EU rule 
The purpose of the EU procurement framework is to tender for projects which 
are provided under the European Development Fund or other EU programs. The aim 
is to ensure that there is equal treatment and no-discrimination in the bidding process 
which promotes competition.546 However, many African countries have implemented 
and amended their laws to comply with these standards using international recognized 
models.547 An example of this is the project relating to the building of a hydropower 
plant in Ethiopia in 2003. 548 The Ethiopian Gilgel Gibe II hydropower plant worth over 
270 million Euro, which was financed through loans provided by the Italian govern-
ment and the EIB and the tender to build the project was awarded to a company with-
out any national or international bidding process.549 The framework applies so as to 
secure transparency in the tendering process and avoid corruption or other govern-
mental issues which might lower effectiveness. However, in case a joint assessment 
shows that domestic procedures and transparency are well, domestic procurement 
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laws may be used.550 As pointed out in the previous section many African govern-
ments lack transparency, corruption remains a systematic problem and donors like the 
EU and others do not trust their systems.551  
The applicable PRAG framework causes the need for domestic adjustments in 
African countries of procurement regulations. For instance, there is a need for a rule 
that allows the application of that foreign framework as it does in Ghana.552 In addition 
the procurement officer involved in the tender might have to content with both the do-
mestic and the EU procurement framework. Furthermore, other donor states and or-
ganisations will also apply their own procurement regulations to tender for their aid 
too.553 This leads to a duplication of rules.554  
The broad options on tendering procedures that are available under the PRAG 
offer procedures many African countries are unfamiliar with.555 An example of such a 
procedure is E-procurement facilities which are just in their infancy in Africa.556 The 
negotiation procedures and other flexible methods are in many African countries re-
stricted to limit the possibility of corruption.557 However, the officers have to take time 
off to receive trainings where they learn new skills and knowledge.558 Understanding 
new procedures could also push reforms in the national procurement system.559 
Besides different procedures the EU framework may exclude a tenderer from 
bidding further if they have made false declarations or there are any irregularities with 
their tender such as fraud, corruption or misconduct when the tenderer is convicted by 
a final judgement of a domestic court of an EU member state.560 This implies that a 
tender convicted under domestic laws of an ACP-country may apply in the PRAG-bid-
ding process.561 In fact, this goes against many domestic laws of ACP-states which 
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could be avoided by excluding everyone who was convicted of a violation of tendering 
procedures of any sovereign state.562 
To conclude this evaluation, the EU rules relating to tendering aid to African 
countries gives the option to strengthen the competition within the ACP-countries of-
fering them the preference to tender within the ACP-countries. However, this frame-
work duplicates existing rules and conflicts with domestic compliance rules of the pro-
cess. 
 
4.4.3. Evaluation of Chinas rule 
China’s purpose in implementing the rule is to tender for contracts. The aim is 
for as many as possible to be awarded to Chinese companies within the investment 
agreement. Consequently, China has a commercial interest in obtaining these con-
tracts. Being familiar with the tendering process assists Chinese companies with their 
bids. However, it cannot be argued that the process is transparent for the relevant Afri-
can country which is probably unfamiliar with Chinese procurement rules. This exacer-
bated by the fact Chinese procurement procedure are not transparent and often in-
comprehensible to the relevant African country.563 Furthermore, when the host-country 
tenders, at least this amount of contacts would be risked to be procured in an “un-
transparent” procedure.  
The critical point is, that China divests the relevant African country which should 
be accountable for the investment project, the authority over to regulate the procure-
ment process. Public procurement is a tool that can be used to ensure public welfare 
and if it is run well it reflects governmental efficiency.564 The importance of purchasing 
goods and services publicly is for instance provided for in section 217 of South Africa’s 
Constitution as a constitutional principle.565 Consequently, the host-country cannot ful-
fil this obligation anymore or just for the amount they claimed for themselves. This 
weakens the authority of the African country. 
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An alternative to this procedure would be that the host-country tenders the con-
tracts through a closed tender process whilst just the Chinese are involved. However, 
Chinese authorities will still have certain impact on the process due to their Outbound 
Investment Law (see 3.4.). This law requires an approval by Chinese authorities be-
fore a Chinese company can invest abroad. This requirement applies in relation to in-
vestments provided via a tendering process too.566 Thus, an awarded Chinese com-
pany rely than on the approval. Moreover, in terms of the Chinese procurement pro-
cess Chinese state-owned enterprises are preferred because of their longer establish-
ment this compromise the competition with private competitors.567  
The second way that China obtains contracts is by directly negotiating for cer-
tain services in the way that Huawei did in Sierra Leone or ZTE (a Chinese state-
owned company) did in Ethiopia.568 In both cases the companies negotiated contracts 
with the relevant African country and as an incentive for awarding the contract a loan 
was provided by Chinese policy bank. The contracts were awarded without Huawei or 
ZTE going through a bidding process.569 That this procedure is legal across Africa is 
doubtful since such award should be made via public procurement process.  
One of the other conditions that show how China prioritises its commercial in-
terests when making investments is that at least 50 per cent of materials, equipment, 
technology or services should be provided by Chinese suppliers for these projects in 
African countries.570 This practice unduly excludes local suppliers from at least 50 per 
cent of supply to a project. This practice is not unique to China however and is also 
done by Western donor countries.571  
However, this does not justify the fact, that it undermines the official procure-
ment procedure of the relevant African country. Even here China prioritises its com-
mercial interests which is confirmed by the fact that the Chinese government controls 
the procurement process. 
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Considering that the EU and China transfer ownership of realizing projects to 
the recipient country both have a voice in the procurement process as pointed out in 
the evaluation above and the sections 2.3.1 and 3.9.1.572 It should be noted that the 
domestic procurement process in many African countries is done through a competi-
tive transparent bidding process which shall be fairly and equally to the competitors.573 
The legal conditions of the EU are preferable in that they provide a system of rules 
which covers these elements and are keeping in line with the process in the host-
country too. 
However, as pointed out in the evaluation above the procurement rules of the 
EU require that some African countries adjust their domestic laws align them with 
these rules and provide training to officials who are involved in the process of tender-
ing for contracts. This can be beneficial because for the officials as they acquire new 
skills. This however causes complexity for to the competitor which has to familiarise 
with external rules. Another issue is the EU rules may conflict with domestic rules re-
lating to compliance of competitors who are excluded from the tendering process un-
der the EU or local regulations. This conflict should be fixed so that uniform rules ap-
ply which will reduce the possibility for abuses of the bidder. However, if one under-
stands the procurement process as a sovereign right and obligation of a government 
(see South Africa’s Constitution), this framework, which is supervised by EU officials, 
is preferable to the Chinese demand of the complete tendering process. 
The legality in African countries of an offer by Chinese companies to complete 
projects in those countries, without going through the public tendering process in 
cases where a Chinese agency simultaneously provides a loan to an African country 
cannot be accessed. This manner of procuring contracts by African countries avoids a 
fair and equal bidding process. The alternative process which avails a number of con-
tracts to local contractors in African countries through their procurement process, re-
voke the full tendering of the recipient. It therefore limits the African countries to 
choose in terms of it wishes to tender the other contracts to. Moreover, whether the 
aim of transparency of proceedings is achieved can be questioned. Most foreign donor 
 
572 Baginski op cit note 472 at 86; Article 2 CA; China’s Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance 
to Other Countries. 
573 Borson op cit note 546 at 377; Elinor Caborn, Sue Arrowsmith “Procurement methods - in the public procure-





states and organizations provide their own procurement regulations for spending their 
budget in African countries.574 This is caused through a lack of trust in the domestic 
procurement regulations and the aim to reduce the risk of corruption.575 The procure-
ment process under these frameworks is conducted with the involvement of the recipi-
ent-country such as under the EU framework but that is not the case here. The option 
to win contracts through by applying domestic laws and to have the ability to negotiate 
these contracts good and helpful but then in general should it not be the case that a 
law has to benefit local contractors and supplier and enable them to have excess to 
domestic projects. 
In addition, China’s demand that at least 50 per cent of the goods used for local 
projects should be supplied by Chinese suppliers shows that China prioritises protect-
ing its commercial interests above all else. This practice excludes local suppliers from 
50 per cent of the project. This requirement can be contrasted with the support pro-
vided by the EDF and its rules for local contractors and suppliers and those of African 
countries which give local suppliers preference and encouragement, even when Euro-
pean companies are contracted to complete the project.576 Indeed, it is noteworthy 
that Chinese companies deliver goods and tender for projects at unbeatable price, 
which must be considered.577 However, when considering this process from a legal 
perspective are these unbeatable prices a threat to equal and fair competition be-
cause the companies are subsidised by the Chinese government – this ultimately 
leads to distortion of competition.578 
In conclusion the EU framework has its issues, but it offers a fairer alternative 
for African countries which apply for investment project. 
 
4.5. The labour rules used in the investment project 
This section evaluates and compares the labour rules which apply to a con-
tracted party under the EU and Chinese Investment legal frameworks. The factious 
case (section 4.2.) will be further discussed and used as an aid to evaluate the labour 
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rules found referred to in section 2.3.2. and 3.9.2. The results will in conclusion be 
compared to find out which legal framework protects employees who are hired to work 
on the project better. 
 
4.5.1. the case continues 
A contractor who has won a tender to complete a project has to be comply with 
certain labour laws and standards. Besides the national laws and regulations of the Af-
rican country the investor or donor can raise or lower the required labour standards 
through its agreement with the relevant host-country. 
Under the EU framework the contractor has to be comply with human rights 
standards and labour standards set by the ILO. The African country are as such en-
couraged to implement these conventions into domestic laws. Contrary to this applies 
the Chinese side no labour standards but labour customs used in Chinese companies 
who are awarded to complete the project. These customs used in Chinese companies 
who are awarded to realize the project. These customs are for example concluding la-
bour contracts verbally, forcing workers to work afterhours with no compensation and 
paying low wages.  
These two approaches do not compatible while the one side sets condition the 
other side already has certain custom and practices in place. But by practicing these 
legal customs the Chinese contractor aims to rule labour matters. Thus, through the 
demand of customs and conditions a comparable set of labour rules provided. 
The evaluation below will not consider the assessment procedures of the Euro-
pean Investment Bank and Chinese policy banks and aid agencies caused by the lack 
of information. 
 
4.5.2. Evaluation of the EU rule 
There is little literature about those labour standards set by the EU when com-
pleting development projects or assistance. The demand for labour standards in the 
Cotonou Agreement is not linked to the purpose of development aid but rather trade. 





all trade agreements with non-EU-countries but does not link it to the development.579 
But because the EDF is linked to the trade agreement of the CA the core labour rights 
are given and benefit so the aid projects too. The African country therefore raises its 
labour standards which the contractor has to comply with during the completion of the 
aid project.580 However, it is clear that in EU aid programs such standards are not ex-
pected which causes further inconsistency when different aid programs (general and 
EDF) apply different standards. 
The purpose of setting international labour standards is to harmonise the em-
ployment relations of the private sector with those of governments.581 This also sup-
ports the economic wellbeing of workers because workers are more productive when 
they are treated fairly and with respect.582 Through the implementation of international 
labour standards into the domestic legal system the contractor is bound by these 
standards while employees can demand the right to bargain.  
The harmonisation is helping if the foreign contractor has the same understand-
ing of the core labour standards, laid down in the ILO conventions. Most African coun-
tries have ratified these conventions except for a few.583 This shows that they have an 
interest in these matters. The exchange of information provides foreign companies or 
contractors with the opportunity to become familiar with labour standards under the 
domestic laws in the relevant African country where the aid project is being completed. 
The eight-core labour conventions of the ILO however do not cover all labour 
issues in all African countries since the laws and issues in these countries’ divers.584 
For example the core conventions do not cover unemployment or poverty wages.585 
The individual worker is not protected through these standards. The CA provides a 
dispute resolution mechanism for conflicts between the contractors who are tasked 
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with completing the aid project in African countries and the host-country but not the 
workers. Labour issues between the contractor and its employees are not part of it. 
Thus, the parties can remain inactive, while the employee is let to the jurisdiction.586 
The demand for human rights and indirect reference through the trade clauses 
in the CA to core labour rights reveals another incoherence in EU’s external relations. 
The demand for these standards does not cover all relevant issues and as such these 
standards are not good enough for protecting workers. However, the majority of Afri-
can countries have ratified the ILO conventions and have given the conventions nor-
mative acknowledgement. 
 
4.5.3. Evaluation of the China rule 
As pointed out in section 3.9.2 China sets no labour conditions and not even 
the minimum human rights conditions are expected as discussed in the previous sec-
tion. Therefore, just the labour laws and regulations of the relevant African country 
take effect. The reason why there are no labour standards is that there is the aim to 
localize Chinese enterprises in the domestic market, by hiring locals for example.587 
However, certain customs are demanded by the Chinese companies. 
Since the accident in the Zambian copper mine in 2005 the safety standard did 
not change until 2011 as found by a Human Rights Watch Report.588 It is unclear if an-
ything has changed since then. However, as described in the construction sector low 
safety standards also set, when Chinese companies employ local workers. When 
compared with Chinese domestic customs one has to ask whether there are similari-
ties in terms of low safety standards.589 Chinese mines are known for being prone to 
accidents and they have a lack of safety standards too.590 In addition to that Chinese 
companies’ treat migrant workers in China worse than the locals.591 As example of this 
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is that Chinese construction workers who are often the supervisor and hold higher po-
sitions, are equipped with safety clothes while African locals have none.592 Thus dis-
crepancy in treatment and attitude by the Chinese is often carried over into African 
countries too.593 
The right of bargaining and joining labour unions in China is not helpful. Even 
when employees strike the only labour union is a union controlled by government 
which does not support workers.594 Contrary to that in African countries labour unions 
are a platform to fight for better working conditions. Chinese companies however have 
developed strategies to avoid the bargaining processes by introducing short-term con-
tracts or by pressuring their employees and causing fear of dismissal.595 
The fact that Chinese companies in some sectors like the textile and clothing 
sector pay low wages is common in China, but this practice becomes problematic 
when transferred to African countries as many of these countries have domestic legis-
lation which set standards for minimum wage. The same applies in relation to forcing 
workers to work afterhours. African countries have rules in relation to the amount on 
hours per day and week that workers should work based on health reasons. Several 
cases are described that Chinese companies demand afterhours with no compensa-
tion and they are allowed only a few breaks.596 It seems to be the norm for Chinese 
workers to work more than eight hours a day and six to seven days a week. 
As it was reported it is a prevailing practise that Chinese companies do not en-
ter into written contracts with workers but rather conclude verbal contracts. This prac-
tice in most African countries causes makes it difficult to proof and enforce labour 
rights such as the right of the payment of wages or the implementation of a probation 
period.597 An excuse that is often used by Chinese employers is that they are unfamil-
iar with domestic laws, however, this excuse does not justify the applicable breach of 
the law. Some African countries have even started to translate labour laws into Chi-
nese.598 Although China introduced its first labour law in 1994, these rules are often 
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violated especially in the informally employment sector.599 Indeed, some argue that 
the Chinese are ignorant regarding domestic labour laws in African countries.600 What 
it shows is a legal cultural gab in labour law.601 
In 2008 a Chinese official advised Namibia to sacrifice implementing labour 
standards in order to attract more investments for developments which will benefit fu-
ture generations.602 Considering that such practices were used to develop China, one 
can comprehend why such partly unlawful practices would be transferred to African 
countries as China’s development model. But this contradicts with China’s principles 
that recipients should choose their own development strategy. Even when there is no 
direct demand of certain customs is, it shows a transfer of work attitude which devel-
oped China. These practices however are probably not working for African country 
when the labour standards of just its Chinese companies are used.  
That being said China became aware of certain labour issues and implemented 
a law relating to corporate social responsibility in 2006. Companies which go abroad 
to Africa should be aware of local laws.603 However, these cases show that there are 
still Chinese labour practices which are unlawful in Africa’s legal systems. 
 
4.5.4. Comparing 
The EU sets a normative approach on labour conditions which is not very high. 
On the other side Chinese state-owned and private companies practice Chinese la-
bour customs and encourage hard work under risky conditions without any clause 
agreed with the host-country. Those customs harm people and are prohibited in Afri-
can countries by laws and regulations. African countries should enforce and apply 
their domestic labour rules. This enforcement is lacking in many African states alt-
hough this is important for the safety of the people. The EU labour standards such as 
contain fairer conditions than Chinese labour conditions. The EU labour standards 
have been confirmed by African countries though the ratification of human rights and 
ILO conventions. 
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The EU labour standards lack case studies relating to how well are EU funded 
projects in African countries complied with labour and human rights standards. The 
EU can be criticised for its lack of consistency in applying external relations. There is 
no direct demand for core labour standards for development funded programs rather 
these apply through the trade agreements which are linked to the EDF. On the other 
side the Development Cooperation Instrument program of the EU tries to strengthen 
labour standards in African societies.  
It also must be noted that while China primarily uses Chinese companies to 
complete projects the EU tries to procure suppliers and contractors from locals in the 
relevant ACP-countries (section 4.4.). Those are more familiar with local customs and 
laws, and by using a harmonised system of labour standards it provides an under-
standing for bargaining and striking. China for instance has just signed four of the ILO 
core labour conventions. If China were to sign the ILO bargaining convention and the 
freedom of assembly, it could drastically improve its labour practices.  
However, afterhours were there prohibited or low safety standards are unac-
ceptable. But it has to be noticed that those case studies, and there are several, do 
not cover all Chinese companies which are active in African countries.604 Even when 
the EU and China agree with African countries to exchange information. However, 
having a stronger legal approach in the investment legal framework and providing le-
gal advises to companies who invest abroad and making them aware of cultural differ-
ences could avoid many unlawful acts.  
The gap between the laws and standards imposed by China and those imposed 
by the EU can perhaps be explained by the difference in legal background. EU laws 
are rooted in its member states which were colonial powers which introduced their 
rules in Africa. This has provided African countries with a different jurisprudential un-
derstanding to China. The Chinese legal system is rooted in Chinese old laws and on 
German and Japanese legal systems which are not that pervasive on the African con-
tinent.605 
The EU approach is low, but acceptable for African host-countries to complete 
projects, foreign unknown customs can apply but this is limited through the process of 
tendering to locals. Not all Chinese companies act unlawfully in Africa. The described 
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customs undermine unjust labour laws which are protected by local governments. 




This chapter evaluates the terms and conditions found in chapter two and three 
and compared the results considering the different approaches described in section 
1.7. The chapter answered the research questions which of both investors set fairer 
conditions to African countries as recipients of investments. 
The political conditions for giving access to grants and loans are motivated by 
the constitutional beliefs of both parties. It has been shown that the political conditions 
of the EU lack the willingness to implement in the majority of African communities. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that the EU is inconsistent in its implementation of ex-
ternal policy and is poor in its enforcement of sanctions as a punishment for human 
rights, democratic principles or the rule of law. Contrary to this is the One-China princi-
ple is easy to implement.  
The procurement rules applied by China and the EU display different socio-eco-
nomic approaches. While China tries to obtain as many contracts as possible through 
its tendering conditions the EU offers its own tendering framework to procure contracts 
preferable to locals, to support the socio-economic development of the relevant Afri-
can country. 
China’s attempt to comply with local domestic labour laws in African countries 
has failed in many cases. Its lack on conditions and unwillingness to familiarise with 
local laws causes the transfer of Chinese labour customs to African countries which 
leads to violations of local labour laws. The EU however sets low human rights and 
ILO labour standards which are easy to implement and also uses local companies 
who are familiar with the laws and customs of the African countries. 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and final remarks 
This thesis presented a comparative analysis of legal frameworks for invest-
ments in Africa by China and the European Union. The aim was to analyse the legal 





find which conditions are fairer for African countries. The thesis considered two differ-
ent approaches backed by historical events, socio-economic and financial interests. 
Those approaches were found again in the legal terms and conditions of both parties.  
The EU with member states which were previously colonial powers have tried in 
their form of concessional loans and grants, so-called official development assistance, 
to mitigate historically caused economic deficits in Africa. They have also tried to fight 
poverty and provide a secure and reliable continent which they can trade with. The EU 
legal framework is an abstract civil law-based regime which is applied incoherence so 
as to further trade and security interests of the EU and its member states in Africa. 
China shares its historical background with African countries as they were both 
colonised and became emerging economies which developed their industries in the 
last four decades. China has also reduced its poverty rate to a minimum. Its aim to be-
come an industrialized nation has caused it to search for new markets and resources. 
Although China also gives grants and interest-free-loans the majority of its invest-
ments are made to with China’s commercial interests. Investing abroad should bring a 
win-win situation for both sides, so loans can be financed with raw materials which Af-
rica has a lot of. The Chinese government encourages Chinese companies to invest 
abroad. China’s external relations are policy-driven and have fewer concrete provi-
sions, than the EU laws. 
In order to give access to aid or investments both parties demand a political de-
cision from Africa’s recipient countries. China asks for the rejection of Taiwan as a 
sovereign state to isolate the country from the international community and cause a 
peaceful unification. The unification is a constitutional objective of China. Except for 
Eswatini all other African countries accept the rule and benefit from China’s invest-
ments. 
The EU demands the acknowledgement and promotion of human rights, demo-
cratic principles and the rule of law. These are also basic principles of constitutional 
treaties of the EU which should be promoted in non-EU-countries. Furthermore, in the-
ory should these principles provide a sustainable development in countries who imple-
ment those values. But studies show that most African countries lack these values and 
the political leaders of African countries are not willing to implement them. Addition to 





economic or security interest is given, which causes incoherence in their external ac-
tions between development aid, trade and security issues.  
The analysis of political conditions from a legal perspective can be provided 
from a practical point of view. How African countries implemented these rules and de-
mand the enforcement of human rights was measured from a practical legal point of 
view. Thus, for the simplicity of China’s rule was it as the fairer one rated especially 
has the rule no impact on Africa’s political or legal systems. However, caused by the 
fact that the promotion of values is laid down in their constitutional treaties it cannot be 
expected that they are willing to re-negotiate these rules.606 
When a loan for a project is given the project must be tendered to a contractor. 
Here is little literature regarding African procurement systems but especially regarding 
its external influence.607 The EU provides its own legal framework which has to be im-
plemented by the African countries which causes duplications and the exclusion of 
certain bidder are not excluded under national laws. However, the host-countries gov-
ernment keeps the control of the tendering process which is supervised by EU officials 
to ensure transparency and fair conditions for the bidder. Moreover, under the EDF 
preference is given to local contractors and suppliers in the African host-country and 
other ACP-countries.  
Contrary to that Chinese firms negotiate directly with African governments and 
provide an option for loans if they contracted. Alternatively, the country requests a 
loan from a Chinese agency and China offers full project management, however, 
many African countries have laws which demand a certain portion of the contract be 
awarded to a local bidder. So, the amount on contracts for Chinese companies is then 
tendered under Chinese laws to Chinese enterprises with an untransparent procedure. 
In addition, China demands that 50 per cent of materials for the project be provided by 
Chinese companies. This is evidence of the fact that China prioritises its commercial 
interests, which are also laid down in economic policies which lead Chinese economy. 
Through the exclusion of the tendering process and the fact that African governments 
have no free choice which company they hire was this a reason to give the EU terms 
the preference. 
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Regarding the labour condition are at least for EU standards little reflected stud-
ies available while China sets no direct condition but many companies implement Chi-
nese labour customs. Those labour customs violate local labour laws in most African 
countries such as those relating to safety in the work place or exploitation of workers 
by requiring workers to work afterhours. Even more Chinese companies intervene in 
the freedom of strike and bargaining which displays a cultural labour rights gap. This 
could be fixed through a stronger enforcement of labour laws in African countries and 
also through BITs. In the latest FOCAC Action Plan they agreed to renew and sign 
new BITs.608 A role model could be the BIT model of the Southern African Develop-
ment Community which contains a labour standard which is similar to the EU stand-
ard.609 
As a minimum the EU expects basic human rights standards to be followed. 
The Cotonou Agreement to which the EDF is connected, contains conditions for core 
labour standards of the ILO. This does not cover all essential labour issues in African 
countries but it sets some standards. It also harmonises labour standards so that for-
eign contractors are familiar with these standards for instance the Convention for Col-
lective Bargaining which China has not signed. Nevertheless, the ILO conventions are 
not demanded but are promoted in other EU funded programs which causes another 
incoherence and displays to the EU the importance of trade-related issues. Through 
the demand for those rights the EU sets conditions which are acknowledged by the Af-
rican countries through signing those conventions. Since the partly implemented cus-
toms by the Chinese often conflict with the domestic labour laws in African countries 
the EU standards are again the better conditions even when it is unclear if the latter 
are good enough. 
This thesis showed that Chinese conditions are economically demanding and 
are less compatible to African legal systems less than the conditions set by EU. How-
ever, the conditions of the EU sometimes conflict with EU internal decisions regarding 
trade or security issues. These conflicting issues can result in incoherent actions by 
the EU with regards to their development aid to African countries which raises con-
cerns. 
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Through their involvement with foreign partners in the last two decades’ African 
countries have gotten the opportunity to consider relevant legal conditions in addition 
to the financial and socio-economic aspects of receiving foreign investment or aid. 
Further research into the legal frameworks covering foreign investments must be 
made. Agreements concluded between China and African countries relating to invest-
ment and aid are not publicly accessible and as such this work is limited. However, the 
legal frameworks concluded with other investors and donor countries and organiza-
tions such as Britain with other emerging nations like India or Russia who also engage 
in Africa must also be studied.  
This work only analysed the legal compatibility of these terms and conditions. In 
addition to that research should be done regarding the effects of legal terms and con-
ditions on African economies and development. The EU and China are well repre-
sented investors in Africa that is why they were chosen for this study but African coun-
tries have other investors to observe too. With the emerging prosperity on the African 
continent its governments can begin to negotiate and demand conditions which are 





















Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1982 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
International Treaties  
African Union Convention on Prevention and Combating Corruption, 2006 
Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of South Africa concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments, 1998 
Banjul Charter - African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1986 
Charter of the United Nations, 1945 
Cotonou Agreement – Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community 
and its Member Stater, of the other part signed at Cotonou, 2000 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 
The Treaty of the European Union, 2009 
 
The Treaty of the Function of the European Union, 2009 
The Treaty of Rome, 1957 (invalid) 
Yaoundè Agreement, Agreement on the Association between the European Economic 
Community and the African countries and Madagascar associated with this community 
- 1963 (invalid) 
III Lomé Convention - Third ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé, 1984 (invalid) 
IV Lomé Convention – Forth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé, 1989 (invalid) 
Economic Partnership Agreement between the East African Community Partner 
States, of the one part and the European Union and its Member States of the Other 
Part, 2016. 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1946 
United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2005 
 
EU Regulations 
EU Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 237/2014 (13.12.2013) establishing an Instru-





EU Regulation No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(11.03.2014) establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace 
EU Regulation No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(11.03.2014) establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
EU Regulation No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(11.03.2014) establishing a European Neighborhood Instrument 
EU Regulation No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(11.03.2014) establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the 
period 2014-2020 
EU Regulation No 234/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(11.03.2014) establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries 
EU Regulation No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(11.03.2014) establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human rights 
worldwide 
EU Regulation 2015/323 of the Council (02.03.2015) on the financial regulation appli-
cable to the 11th European Development Fund 
Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EU External Actions (PRAG), (14.03.2013)  
 
Cases 
Ceskoslovenska obchodni banka, a.s. v. Slovak Republic – International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Dispute - Case No. ARB/97/4. 
Miha v. Equatorial Guinea, at Human Rights Commmittee (10 August 1994) 




Abrahamsen, Rita “Discourses of democracy, practices of autocracy: shifting mean-
ings of democracy in the aid-authoritarianism nexus” in Tobias Hagmann, Filip 
Reyntjens “Aid and authoritarianism in Africa - Development without Democracy”, 
2016 
Addo, Michael K. “Some Issues in European Community Policy and Human Rights” 
15 (1988) Legal Issues of European Integration p. 73 
 
Adogamhe, Paul G. “PAN-AFRICANISM Revisited: Vision and Reality of African 
Unity and Development” 2 (2008) African Review of Integration p. 1 
Aryada, Estelle “Emerging Disciplines on Labour Standards in Trade Agreements” 





Baah, Anthony Yaw; Jauch, Herbert “Chinese investments in Africa” in Anthony 
Yaw Baah, Herbert Jauch “Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective” 
(2009), African Labour Research Network 
 
Baginski, Pawel “Provisions and Implications of the Cotonou Agreement” 12 (2003) 
Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, p. 73 
 
Benedek, Wolfgang „Article 208 AEUV“ in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf, Martin 
Nettesheim “Das Recht der Europäischen Union – Band I-III EUV/AEUV“ (2019) 
Benedek Wolfgang „Article 209 AEUV“ in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf, Martin 
Nettesheim “Das Recht der Europäischen Union – Band I-III EUV/AEUV“ (2019) 
Birsel, Robert “Gambia president tells China previous Taiwan ties a ‘huge mistake’ 
(06.09.2018) Reuters, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-africa-
gambia/gambia-president-tells-china-previous-taiwan-ties-a-huge-mistake-
idUSKCN1LM1HV 
Blanchard, Ben “China wins back Burkina Faso, urges Taiwan’s last African ally to 




Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo “A Human Rights Focus to Upgrade China’s International 
Lending” 5 (2019) The Chinese Journal of Global Governance p. 69 
Phoebe Bolton “Government Procurement as a Policy Tool in South Africa” 6 (2006) 
Journal of Public Procurement, p. 193 
Borson, Fred “EU Procurement Policy under Development Aid Financing” 11 (2016) 
European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, p. 220 
Borson, Fred “Foreign Aid Procurement Policies of Development Partners in Africa: 
The Case of Ghana” 61 (2017) Jounral of African Law p. 373 
Bosshard, Peter “China’s Role in Financing African Infrastructure” (2007) Interna-
tional Rivers Network 
Brautigam, Deborah “Governance and Economy: A Review, Policy and Review De-
partment” (1991) The World Bank 
Brautigam, Debora “The Dragon’s Gift” (2009) 
 
Cabestan, Jean-Pierre “Taiwan’s Mainland Policy: Normalization, Yes; Reunification, 
Later”, 148 (1996) China Quarterly p. 1260 
 
Caborn, Elinor, Arrowsmith, Sue “Procurement methods - in the public procurement 






Campos, Indira; Vines, Alex “Angola and China – A Pragmatic Partnership” (2005) 
Working Paper Presented at a CSIS Conference 
 
Cheng, Cheng “The Logic Behind China’s Foreign Aid Agency” Carnegie Endowment 
for International Pease  (21.05.2019), available at: https://carnegieendow-
ment.org/2019/05/21/logic-behind-china-s-foreign-aid-agency-pub-79154. 
Chinadaily “Backgrounder: Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (22.04.2015) 
available at: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/2015-04/22/con-
tent_20509374.htm 
Chinadaily “China and Zhou Enlai lay basis for the future at Bandung Conference” 
(22.04.2015), available at: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/2015-
04/22/content_20509367.htm 
Chinadaily “China-Gambia relations see rapid development on all fronts: Chinese 
FM” (06.01.2019) available at: http://www.china-
daily.com.cn/a/201901/06/WS5c31b2b7a31068606745f154.html 
Chinese Government “13thFive-Year-Plan for Economic and Social Development of 
the People’s Republic of China” (2016-2020), available at: https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/poli-
cyrelease_8233/201612/P020191101482242850325.pdf 
Chinese Government “China’s Action plan on the Belt and Road Initiative” updated 
March 2015, available at: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publica-
tions/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm 
Chinese Government “China’s first Africa policy” (20.09.2006), available at: 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zgdfzzc/t481748.htm 
Chinese Government “China’s second Africa policy” (05.12.2015), available at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/world/2015-12/05/content_37241677_2.htm 
Chinese Government “China Going Global between ambition and capacity” (2017) 
Working Paper of China Policy available at: https://policycn.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/05/2017-Chinas-going-global-strategy.pdf 
Chinese Government “White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid” (21.04.2011), available 
at: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/con-
tent_281474986284620.htm 
Chinese Government “White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid” (10.07.2014) available 
at: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/con-
tent_281474982986592.htm 
Congyan Cai “Human Rights Conditionality and International Economic Relations: A 






Corkin, Lucy “Redefining Foreign Policy Impulses toward Africa: The Roles of the 
MFA, the MOFCOM and China Exim Bank” 4 (2011) Journal of Current Chinese Af-
fairs p. 63 
Dagbanja, Dominic N. “The regulatory framework for public procurement in Ghana” in 
S. Arrowsmith & G. Quinot “Public Procurement Regulation in Africa” (2013) 
Das Deutsche Baugewerbe “Robl: Keine Steuergelder an chinesische Staatsunter-
nehmen! Deutsches Baugewerbe fordert bei EU-kofinanzierten Bauvorhaben aus-





Davis, Martyn; Edinger, Hannah; Tay, Nastasya; Naidu, Sanusha “How China de-
livers development assistance to Afirca” (2008) Center for Chinese Studies p. 57 
Dominguez Gabriel “‘Made in China 2025’ – The next stage of China’s economic 
rise?” (02.06.2015) DW, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/made-in-china-2025-the-
next-stage-of-chinas-economic-rise/a-18490377 
Dreher, Axel; Fuchs, Andreas; Parks, Brad; Strange, Austin M.; Tierney, Michael 
J. “Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Fi-
nancing from China to Africa” 62 2018 International Studies Quarterly p. 182 
Dzaka-Kikouta, Théophile; Kern, Francis; Gonella, Chiara “Chinese economic co-
operation with Central Africa and the transfer of knowledge and know-how” (2013) 2 
African East-Asian Affairs, p. 39 
 




Ebert, Franz Christian “Labour provisions in EU trade agreements: What potential for 
channelling labour standards-related capacity building?” 155 2006 International La-
bour Review p. 407 
 
Ebert, Franz Christian “The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CFTA): Are Existing Arrangements Sufficient to Prevent Adverse Effects on Labour 
Standards?” 33 (2017) International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations p. 295 
 
Eswatini Government “Press Statement No: 18/2019 Eswatini, Taiwan Relations”, 







EU Commission “2017 Annual Activity Report – Service for Foreign Policy Instru-
ments”, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/sites/fpi/files/documents/fpi-aar-2017-an-
nexes_en.pdf 
 
European Commission “Aid for Trade Report 2015” (22.06.2015)  




European Commission “International development Aid” available at: https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/interna-
tional-economic-relations/international-development-aid_en (accessed on 09 February 
2020) 
 
European Commission “Restoring Faith in Justice in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo” available at: https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/showcases/restoring-faith-justice-demo-
cratic-republic-congo_en 
European Council “Cotonou Agreement” (16.01.2020) available at: https://www.con-
silium.europa.eu/en/policies/cotonou-agreement/ 
EU Council Decision 94/697/CFSP (24.10.1994) 
EU Council Decision 2010/427/EU (26.07.2010) 
European Development Fund, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/DE/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r12102 
 
European Investment Bank (EIB) “Activity Report 2014” 
 
European Investment Bank (EIB) “Annual Report 2016 On EIB Activity in Activity in 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, and the Overseas Countries and Territories” 
 
Europa Parliament “Fact Sheets on the European Union – Multiannual Financial 
Framework” May 2019, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/fact-
sheets/en/sheet/29/mehrjahriger-finanzrahmen 
 
European Union “EU Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the 
governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parlia-
ment and the Commission”, 2017/C210/01, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/le-
gal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:42017Y0630(01)&from=EN 
 
European Union External Action “Statement by the Spokesperson on Angola‘s ac-








The Export-Import Bank of China “Annual Report 2018” 
 
Fantini, Emanuele; Puddu, Luca “Ethiopia and international aid: development be-
tween high modernism and exceptional measures” in Tobias Hagmann, Filip 
Reyntjens “Aid and authoritarianism in Africa – Development without Democracy” 
(2016) 
Fiott, Daniel “The EU and China in Africa: The Case of Kenya” 3 (2010) Madariaga 
Paper p.1 
 




Friends of the Earth United States “China Development Bank and China Export-Im-
port Bank” (January 2016) 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) “Action Plan 2000” 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) “Action Plan 2006” 
 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) “Action Plan 2018” 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) “Beijing Declaration of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation of the 10-12 October 2000”, available at: https://www.fo-
cac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t606796.htm. 
 
Forster, Doris “On the Methods for Comparative Law Research in Legal Studies” 
(2018) Ancilla Iuris: Constellations of Law p.98 
 
Fu Junwei “China” in Jan M. Smits “Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law” 2. ed., 
(2012) 
 
Geda, Alemayehu; Meskel, Atenafu G. Meskel “Impact of China-Africa Investment 
Relations: Case Study of Ethiopia” (2010) African Economic Research Consortium 
Collaborative Research on the Impact of China on Africa 
 
Glanert, Simone “Method?” in Pier Giuseppe Monateri “Methods of Comparative 
Law” (2012) 
 
Glaeser, Edward L.; La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, An-
drei “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” 9 (2004) Journal of Economic Growth p. 271 
Glee, H. Patrick “The aims of comparative law” in Jan M. Smits “Elgar Encyclopedia 





Grimm, Sven “Afrika in der internationalen Politik – Die Verträge von Lomé und Coto-
nou“ (2009) 2 Informationen zur politischen Bildung 63, available at: 
https://www.bpb.de/izpb/7954/afrika-in-der-internationalen-politik?p=5 
Gordley, James “The functional method” in Pier Giuseppe Monateri “Methods of 
Comparative Law” (2012) 
Gruni Giovanni “Enforcing labour standards via EU free-trade agreements” 
(18.02.2019), available at: https://www.socialeurope.eu/enforcing-labour-standards 
Haacke, Owen “Understanding China’s 13th Five-Year Plan” (12.02.2015) China 
Business Review, available at: https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/understanding-
chinas-13th-five-year-plan/ 
Hachez, Nicolas; Wouters, Jan “A Responsible Lender? The European Investment 
Bank’s Environmental, Social and Human Rights Accountability” 49 (2012) Common 
Market Law Review p. 47 
Hackenesch, Christine “European Good Governance Policies Meet China in Africa: 
Insights from Angola and Ethiopia – Working Paper” (February 2011) German Devel-
opment Institute 
Hamlin, Kevin; Gridneff, Ilya; Davison, William “Ethiopia Becomes China’s China in 
Search for Cheap Labor” (22.06.2014) Bloomberg available at: https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2014-07-22/ethiopia-becomes-china-s-china-in-search-for-
cheap-labor 
James Harrison, Mirela Barbu, Liam Campling, Franz Christian Ebert, Deborah 
Martens, Axel Marx, Jan Orbie, Ben Richardson, Adrian Smith (James Harrison 
et al.) “Labour Standards Provisions in EU Free Trade Agreements: Reflections on the 
European Commission’s Reform Agenda” 18 (2019) World Trade Review p. 635 
Haroz, David “China in Africa: Symbiosis or Exploitation?”, Vol. 35 2011, The Fletcher 
Forum of World Affairs p. 67 
Hilf, Meinhard, Schorkopf, Frank “Artikel 2 EUV” in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf, 
Martin Nettesheim “Das Recht der Europäischen Union – Band I-III EUV/AEUV“ 
(2019) 
Hipold, Peter “EU Development Cooperation at a Crossroads: The Cotonou Agree-
ment of 23 June and the Principle of Good Governance” 7 (2002) European Foreign 
Affairs Review p. 53 
Hoffmeister, Frank „Artikel 2012 AEUV“ in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf, Martin 
Nettesheim “Das Recht der Europäischen Union – Band I-III EUV/AEUV“ (2019) 
Holterhus, Till Patrik “The Legal Dimensions of Rule of Law Promotion in EU Foreign 
Policy: EU Treaty Imperatives and Rule of Law Conditionality in the Foreign Trade and 





Hopewell Kristen “What is ‘Made in China 2025’ – and why is it a threat to Trump’s 
trade goals?” (03.05.2018) The Washington Post, available at: https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/03/what-is-made-in-china-2025-and-
why-is-it-a-threat-to-trumps-trade-goals/ 
Huang, Meibo; Qi, Xie “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: Development and Pro-
spects” 74 (2013) African East Asian Affairs, p. 10 
Hudson, G. F. “One China or Two” 10 (1962) China Quartely p 78 
Human Rights Watch “World Report 2019 – Mozambique”, available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/mozambique 




International Labor Organization (ILO) “Ratifications of fundamental Conventions by 
country”, available at:  https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEX-
PUB:10011:0::NO::P10011_DISPLAY_BY,P10011_CONVENTION_TYPE_CODE:1,F 
 
Jauch, Herbert, Iipumbu Sakaria “Chinese Investments in Namibia: A Labour Per-
spective” (March 2009) Labour Resource and Research Institute 
Kidane, Won “China-African Investment Treaties: Old Rules, New Challenges” 37 
(2014) Fordham International Law Journal p.1035 
King, Toby “Human Rights in European Foreign Policy: Success or Failure for Post-
modern Diplomacy?” (1999) European Journal of International Law, p. 313 
Kiruga, Morris, “Ethiopia’s China challenge” (27.03.2019) The Africa Report, availa-
ble at: https://www.theafricareport.com/11080/ethiopias-china-challenge/ 
Klovert, Heike “Wer den Bauboom in Afrika vorantreibt” (23.11.2019) Der Spiegel 
available at: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/chinesen-in-aethiopien-wer-den-
bauboom-in-afrika-vorantreibt-a-1279872.html 
Koepf, Tobias, “Afrika in der internationalen Politik – Rolle Frankreichs und Großbri-
tanniens“ (2009) 303 Informationen zur politischen Bildung, available at: 
https://www.bpb.de/izpb/7954/afrika-in-der-internationalen-politik?p=2 
Krajewski, Markus “Wirtschaftsvölkerrecht” 4 ed (2017) 
Le Belzic, Sebastien “China’s Exim bank: Africa’s largest financier looks for an even 
bigger role” (25.10.2012) The Africa Report, available at: https://www.theafricare-
port.com/6472/chinas-exim-bank-africas-largest-financier-looks-for-an-even-bigger-
role/ 
Madowo, Larry “eSwatini – Taiwan’s last friend in Afirca” (14.01.2019) BBC News, 






Masuku, Lunga “Taiwan’s last African ally holds out despite overtures by China 
(31.08.2018) Reuters, available at:  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-africa-
swaziland/taiwans-last-african-ally-holds-out-despite-overtures-by-china-
idUSKCN1LG0L6 
Maurin, Cristelle, Yeophantong, Pichamon “Going Global Responsibly? China’s 
Strategies Towards “Sustainable” Overseas Investments” 86 (2013) Pacific Affairs p. 
281 
 
McBride, James; Chatzky, Andrew “Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Treat to Global 
Trade?” (13.05.2019) Council on Foreign Relations, available at: 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade 
 
Mercurio Bryan “Growth and development: Economic and Legal Conditions” 30 
(2007) University of New South Wales Law Journal p. 437 
Missiroli, Antonio “The EU and the World: Players and Policies Post-Lisbon: A Hand-
book” European Union Institute for Security Studies (2016) 
Mitchell, Ian; Elliot, Kimberly Ann “Brexit: What Next for Trade and Development?” 
(30.012020) Center for Global Development, available at: 
https://www.cgdev.org/blog/brexit-what-next-trade-and-development 
Mizner, Andrew “China to invest USD 60 billion in Africa” (01.10.2018) African Law & 
Business available at: https://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/8609-china-to-in-
vest-usd-60-billion-in-africa 
Moss, Todd; Rose, Sarah “China ExIm Bank and Africa: New Lending, New Chal-
lenges” (2006) Center for Global Development CGD Notes 
Müller, Peter “Auf nach Afrika” (07.12.2019) Der Spiegel, available at: 
https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ursula-von-der-leyen-besucht-aethiopien-addis-
abeba-statt-washington-a-1300225.html (accessed on 09 February 2019)  
 
Nantulya, Paul “Implications for Africa from China’s One Belt One Road Strategy” 
(22.03.2019) Africa Center for Strategic Studies, available at: https://africacen-
ter.org/spotlight/implications-for-africa-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy/ 
Nettesheim, Martin „Artikel 205 AEUV“ in Rudolf Streinz „Becksche-Kurz-Kommentar 
EUV/AEUV“ (ed.) 3.ed. (2018) available at: https://www.theafricareport.com/421/the-
world-bank-and-imf-are-necessary-evils-julius-maada-bio-president-sierra-le-
one/#ixzz5cIcS27h4 
Nolte, Georg “Article 2” in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, An-






Norbook, Nicholas; Smith, Patrick “The World Bank and IMF are necessary evils” 
(2018) 106 The Africa Report p. 48 
Nwabueze, Caroline J; Pofinet, Diana “The Rule of Law and Integrity: Appraising the 
Place and Role of Anti-Corruption Standards in the Fight against Corruption within the 
Central African Economic and Monetary Community” 51 (2018) The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa p. 207 
OECD “DAC List of ODA Recipients”, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-
sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DAC-List-of-ODA-Recipi-
ents-for-reporting-2018-and-2019-flows.pdf 
OECD “Net ODA (indicator)”, available at: https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm 
 
OECD “Official Development Assistance” available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/financ-
ing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-as-
sistance.htm 




OECD “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” (02.03.2015) 
Ohler, Christoph “Artikel 309 AEUV” in Rudolf Streinz „Becksche-Kurz-Kommentar 
EUV/AEUV“ (ed.) 3.ed. (2018) 
Pechstein, Matthias „Artikel 2 EUV“ in Rudolf Streinz „Becksche-Kurz-Kommentar 
EUV/AEUV“ (ed.) 3.ed. (2018) 
Perry Alex “In Afrika: Reise in die Zukunft” (2016) 
Publish what you found “Aid Transparency Index 2018” available at: http://www.pub-
lishwhatyoufund.org/reports/2018-Aid-Transparency-Index.pdf 
Raphulu, Lusanda “Chinese Companies in SA” (24.01.2018) Bowmanslaw available 
at: https://www.bowmanslaw.com/insights/employment/chinese-companies-sa/ 
Publish what you found “China – Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)” available at: 
https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/the-index/2018/china-mofcom/ 
Regelsberger Elfriede, Dieter Kugelmann „Artikel 21 EUV“ in Rudolf Streinz „Beck-
sche-Kurz-Kommentar EUV/AEUV“ (ed.) 3.ed. (2018) 
Riebau, Anne Meike “Rückübernahmeabkommen und partnerschaftliche Steuerungs-
instrumente: Menschenrechte als wirtschaftliche Tauschware auf dem politischen Tab-





Riemenschneider Jakob “Latest Trends of China Overseas Direct Investment Regu-
lations” (29.01.2018) TaylorWesing, available at: https://china.taylor-
wessing.com/en/latest-trends-of-china-overseas-direct-investment-regulations 
Rossi, Matthias “Artikel 309 AEUV” in Christian Calliess, Matthias Ruffert 
“EUV/AEUV” 5. ed. 2016 
Saigal, Kanika “London Calling Africa” (2018) 103 The Africa Report, p. 56 
Sandgren, Claes “Legal Development Cooperation: Conditions, Principles, and Meth-
ods, Studies in International Financial” 6 (2003-2004) Economic and Technology Law 
p. 15 
Schmidt, Siegmar , “Afrika in der internationalen Politik – Die Afrikanische Union“ 303 
(2009) Informationen zur politischen Bildung 53, available at: 
https://www.bpb.de/izpb/7954/afrika-in-der-internationalen-politik?p=0 
Shaw, Malcolm N. “International Law” 6. ed. (2008) 
Sheng, Michael ; Öhvall, Daniel “Chinese outbound investment regulations for a new 
year” (17.01.2018) Ashurst, available at: https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-in-
sights/legal-updates/chinese-outbound-investment-regulations-for-a-new-year/ 
Shepard, Wade “What China Is Really Up To in Africa” (03.10.2019) Forbes, available 
at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2019/10/03/what-china-is-really-up-to-
in-africa/#1fd7f4695930 
Smith, Karen E. “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third 
Countries: How Effective?” 3 (1998) European Foreign Affairs Review p. 253 
Smith Patrick “Africa’s place in the world” 101 (2018) The Africa Report p. 4 
Stoll, Peter-Tobias; Rigod Boris “Artikel 309 AEUV” in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard 
Hilf, Martin Nettesheim “Das Recht der Europäischen Union – Band I-III EUV/AEUV“ 
(2019) 
Stoll, Peter-Tobias; Rigod Boris “Artikel 309 AEUV” in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard 
Hilf, Martin Nettesheim “Das Recht der Europäischen Union – Band I-III EUV/AEUV“ 
(2019) 
Streinz, Rudolf “Artikel 6 EUV” in Rudolf Streinz „Becksche-Kurz-Kommentar 
EUV/AEUV“ 3.ed. (2018) 
Streinz, Rudolf „Artikel 208 AEUV“ in Rudolf Streinz „Becksche-Kurz-Kommentar 
EUV/AEUV“ 3.ed. (2018) 
Sun, Yun “China’s 2018 financial commitments to Africa: Adjustment and recalibra-








Szczudlik-Tatar, Justyna “Soft Power in China’s Foreign Policy” 19 (2010) Polish 
Quarterly of International Affairs p. 45 
Tang, Frank “China sets new rules overseas investment for its biggest deal makers” 
(27.12.2017) South China Morning Post available at: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2125725/china-sets-new-rules-
overseas-investment-its-biggest-deal-makers 
Tang, Xiaoyang “Bulldozer or Locomotive? The Impact of Chinese Enterprises on the 
Local Employment in Angola and the DRC” 45 (2010) Journal of Asian and African 
Studies p. 386 
The Associated Press “China Resumes Ties With Sao Tomé Which Turned Away 
Form Taiwan” (26.12.2016) The New York Times, available at: https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/12/26/world/asia/china-taiwan-sao-tome-diplomatic-relations.html 
Transparency International “Corruption Percentage Index 2019: Global Hihlights” 
(23.01.2020), available at:  https://www.transparency.org/news/fea-
ture/cpi_2019_global_highlights#CountriesToWatch 
Transparency International “Corruption Percentage Index 2019: Sub-Saharan Af-
rica” (23.01.2020) available at: https://www.transparency.org/news/fea-
ture/cpi_2019_Sub_Saharan_Africa 
Transparency International “Corruption Percentage Index 2019: Western Europe & 
European Union” (23.01.2020) available at: https://www.transparency.org/news/fea-
ture/cpi_2019_global_highlights#CountriesToWatch 
Tiezzi Shannon “FOCAC 2018: Rebranding China in Africa” (05.09.2018) The Diplo-
mat, available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/focac-2018-rebranding-china-in-af-
rica/ 
 
Tsabora, James “Public Procurement in Zimbabwe: Law, Policy and Practice” (2014) 
African Public Procurement Law Journal p. 1 
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Economic 
Development in Africa Report 2010, South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New 
Forms of Development Partnership”, (2010) 
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “World Invest-
ment Report 2019” (2019) 
 
Wang, Hongying; Hu, XueYing “China’s “Going-Out” Strategy and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Preliminary Evidence of a “Boomerang Effect”” 26 (2017) Journal of 
Contemporary China p. 820 
Wang Long, Bateman Joshua “China’s Medical Aid in Africa” (14.03.2018) The Dip-





Wei Jiang “A Chinese Solution“ 99 (2018) The Africa Report p. 14 
Weiß, Wolfgang „Artikel 207 AEUV“ in in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf, Martin Net-
tesheim “Das Recht der Europäischen Union – Band I-III EUV/AEUV“ (2019) 
Xiang, Rong “Regulation of Foreign Aid: China” (06.09.2015) Library of Congress, 
available at: http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-aid/china.php#Framework 
Yang, Liu; Doh, Cyprian Nugah “China and Botswana: legal and cultural differences 
in labour laws” (2013) African East-Asian Affairs p. 50 
Young-Anawaty, Amy “Human Rights and the ACP-EEC Lomé II Convention: Busi-
ness as usual at the EEC” 13 (1980) New York University Journal of International Law 
and Politics p. 63 
 
Yejoo, Kim “Africa – The People’s Republic’s exclusive playground?” 71 (2012) Afri-
can East Asian Affairs p. 25 
Yu Jack “China’s Outbound Investment Regulation Update” (06.11.2017) Fasken, 
available at: https://www.fasken.com/en/knowledge/2018/01/china-releases-new-
rules-regulating-outbound-investment/#authors 
Zeng, Aiping; Zhan, Shu “Origin, Achievements, and Prospects of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation” (2018) International Studies p. 88 
Liu, Zhen “China ‘will continue to oppose Taiwan independence’ after Tsai Ing-wen’s 
election victory” (20.01.2020) South China Morning Post available at: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3046757/china-will-continue-oppose-
taiwan-independence-after-tsai-ing 
Zhou, Laura “Ethiopia in talks with China to ease ‘serious debt pressure’ tied to New 
Silk Road rail link, envoy says” (24.03.2019) South China Morning Post, available at: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3002957/ethiopia-talks-china-
ease-serious-debt-pressure-tied-new-silk 
Zweigert, Konrad; Kötz, Hein “An Introduction to Comparative Law” 3.ed (1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
